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TAXATION AND THE FAMILY
A persistent problem in the theory of income taxation is whether natu-
ral persons should be taxed as isolated individuals, or as social beings whose
family ties to other taxpayers affect their taxpaying capacity.' From its in-
ception, the federal income tax law has permitted every taxpayer to file a
personal return, embracing his or her own income but excluding the in-
come of the taxpayer's spouse, children, and other relatives. On the other
hand, married couples may elect to consolidate their income on a joint
return, many exemptions and deductions take account of family links and
responsibilities, and the income or property of one member of a family is
sometimes attributed to another member for a variety of tax purposes. The
Internal Revenue Code, in brief, is a patchwork, its history being a myriad
of compromises fashioned to meet particular problems.
While this tension between rugged individualism and family solidarity
permeates the entire Code, four broad questions capture the major themes:
-Should family members-husbands, wives, children, or others-be re-
quired, allowed, or forbidden to amalgamate their separate incomes in
order to compute a joint tax liability?
-If amalgamation is either permitted or required, what should be the
relationship between the tax liability of a family on its amalgamated
income and that of a person living outside any family unit on his or
her individual income?
-Should the taxpayer-whether an individual or a family entity-receive
a tax allowance for supporting children, parents, or other relatives?
-How should the tax law treat transfers, sales, and other financial and
property arrangements between family members, and for what tax pur-
poses (if any) should the law attribute the income or property of one
family member to another?
The responses of today's law to these questions are, of course, influenced
by the need for revenue, by the Internal Revenue Service's capacity to audit
x. See Treasury Department, The Tax Treatment of Family Income, reprinted in Hearings on
Revenue Revisions Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 8oth Cong., rst Sess., pt. 2, at 846
(947) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Department); COLMYN Coars'N., REPORT OF THE ROYAL Com-
mIssioN oN INcomE TAx, C.tn. No. 615 (192o); ROYAL CoIMiSIoN ON THE TaXATION OF PRoFrrs
AND INCO iE, SEcOND REPORT, CAm. No. 9105, at 37 (1954); H. GROvEs, FEDERAL TAx TREATmENT
OF THE F im"y (x963); W. VicxaREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIm TAXATION 274-301 (1947); Thorson,
The Selection of a Tax Unit Under the Income Tax-The Individual Versus the Family Unit, April
20, x962 (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter cited as Thorson Disserta-
tion]; Klein, Familial Relationships and Economic Well-Being: The Family Unit Rules for a Negative
Income Tax, 9 HAXv. J. LEG. 361 (1971); Oldman & Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Tax-
ation of Married Persons, 12 ST~AN. L. REv. 585 (196o); Pechman, Income Splitting, in i HousE
Comm.. ON WAYs & MxANs, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., TAx REviSION COMPENDIUM 473 (Comm. Print
1959); Shoup, Married Couples Compared with Single Persons Under the Income Tax, 25 NAT'L TAx
Ass'N BuL. xo (Supp. 1940); Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TaxEs 98o (946);
Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy Over the Tax Treatment of Family
Income, iS NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1965). See also note 4 infra.
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returns and enforce the rules, by legislative and administrative efforts to
minimize inconsistencies within the statute and regulations, and by other
objectives, constraints, and values that are "internal" to the tax system. But
the impact of these factors on Congress, the Treasury, and the public has
always depended on a much more influential context-society's assump-
tions about the role of marriage and the family.
We are living in a period of unprecedented debate about the status of
marriage and the family. Citizens, moral philosophers, political groups,
legislators, and judges are questioning many traditional legal distinctions
between men and women, between informal alliances and ceremonial
marriage, between legitimate and illegitimate children, between'the role
of the family and the role of the state, and between the power of parents
and the rights of children. In such an era, it is fatuous to expect the prem-
ises underlying the Internal Revenue Code to escape inquiry or to suppose
that income taxation has a "logic" of its own capable of supplying certi-
tudes to a society wracked by doubts.
For these reasons, the Internal Revenue Code's current answers to the
questions set out above are ripe for reexamination. The goal of this Essay
is to examine the theories and pressures that shaped today's Internal Reve-
nue Code and to suggest how its provisions may fare in the maelstrom of
changing social attitudes toward marriage, women's rights, the two-job
couple, communal living patterns, birth control, population growth, and
intrafamily rights and liabilities. I hope this will be a useful inquiry, de-
spite the paucity of confident answers and the certainty that any tax re-
forms spawned by today's social trends will be as particularistic and transi-
tory as the laws they supplant.
I. CONSOLiDATION OF FAMILy INcOME
A. Theoretical Considerations
i. The case for consolidation.
By and large, tax theorists have espoused the doctrine "that taxpaying
ability is determined by total family income regardless of the distribution
of such income among the members of the family," rather than the con-
trary theory "that the family as a unit has no combined taxpaying ability
per se; that its taxpaying ability is composed of the separate taxpaying
abilities of its individual members; and that the taxpaying ability of each
of these is determined by the amount of income of which he or she is the
owner without reference to the income of the other members of the faro-
[Vol. 27: Page 13891392
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ily." The philosophy of consolidation was recently championed in an in-
fluential report by the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation.' Its legis-
lative proposals in this area were not enacted, but the Commission's state-
ment in favor of consolidating family income is an excellent exposition of
the social premises that underlie this position:
We conclude that the present [Canadian tax] system is lacking in essential fairness
between families in similar circumstances and that attempts to prevent abuses of
the system have produced serious anomalies and rigidities. Most of these results
are inherent in the concept that each individual is a separate taxable entity. Tax-
ation of the individual in almost total disregard for his inevitably close financial
and economic ties with the other members of the basic social unit of which he is
ordinarily a member, the family, is in our view [a] striking instance of the lack
of a comprehensive and rational pattern in the present tax system. In keeping with
our general theme that the scope of our tax concepts should be broadened and
made more consistent in order to achieve equity, we recommend that the family
be treated as a tax unit and taxed on a rate schedule applicable to family units.
Individuals who are not members of a family unit would continue to be treated
as separate tax units and would be taxed on a schedule applicable to indi-
viduals....
We believe firmly that the family is today, as it has been for many centuries,
the basic economic unit in society. Although few marriages are entered into for
purely financial reasons, as soon as a marriage is contracted it is the continued
income and financial position of the family which is ordinarily of primary concern,
not the income and financial position of the individual members. Thus, the mar-
ried couple itself adopts the economic concept of the family as the income unit
from the outset. In western society the wife's direct financial contribution to the
family income through employment is frequently substantial. It is probably even
more true that the newly formed family acts as a financial unit in making its
expenditures. Family income is normally budgeted between current and capital
outlays, and major decisions involving the latter are usually made jointly by the
spouses....
Where the family grows by the addition of children, further important finan-
cial and economic decisions are made in the family as a unit. Questions of the
extent of education, time of entrance into the labour force and, frequently, choices
of a career are decided on a family basis, although of course there are many ex-
ceptions to this statement. In some circumstances the income of the child is added
to the family income, and, even where this is not done directly, the fact that a
child has income of his own will have some bearing on the main family ex-
penditure decisions. Certainly when the child becomes self-supporting he is nor-
2. Treasury Department, supra note x, at 851. For citations to the comments of tax theorists, of
whom very few have favored basing tax liability on individual income, see Thorson Dissertation, supra
note i
3. REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoamhussioN ON TAXATION (Carter Commission) (x966). See Bittker,
Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 35 U. Cm. L. REv.
637 (1968); Groves, Taxing the Family Unit: The Carter Commission's Proposals and U.S. Practice,
22 NAT'L Tax J. io9 (x969); Note, Tax Treatment of the Family: The Canadian Royal Commission
and the Internal Revenue Code, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 98 (1968).
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mally expected to relieve the family of further expenditure on his behalf. Thus,
the income position of children has an important bearing on the family income,
although frequently in an indirect way.4
This rationale implies that the tax on a family with a given amount of
consolidated income should be the same regardless of the proportion of
each spouse's contribution to their total income,' and it also suggests,
though less clearly, that the ratio of parent-child contributions should also
be irrelevant. A corollary of this emphasis on the family's consolidated in-
come is that legal ownership of property and income within the family
should be disregarded in judging its taxpaying capacity. For at least 5o
years, a major theme in the taxation of income from property transferred
within the family has been that bedchamber transactions are suspect be-
cause the allocation of legal rights within the family is a trivial matter.'
But the persons concerned may have a less cavalier attitude toward their
legal rights. Taxpayers pass up many opportunities to reduce their taxes
by intrafamily gifts,7 possibly from ignorance or inertia, but perhaps be-
cause they attach more significance to their legal rights than academicians
assert. The contemporary women's rights movement is a reminder of the
long struggle for married women's property laws, whose underlying prem-
ise was that the division of legal rights between husband and wife is a sig-
nificant matter, not a trivial one. Of course, the legal recognition of the
property rights of married women may have brought with it, or resulted
from, a fundamental change in matrimonial psychology, causing the legal
rights acquired by the wife to be as irrelevant as those retained by the hus-
band, at least while the marriage lasts. But it is far from self-evident that
the property rights won by married women are inconsequential. Moreover,
at least among upper-income taxpayers, it is not uncommon for separate
accounts to be maintained for property owned by each spouse at the time
of the marriage, inherited thereafter, or accumulated from earnings or
household allowances, especially if the household includes children of a
prior marriage. It may be, therefore, that tax theorists have excessively
downgraded the importance of legal rights within the family, and that a
swing of the pendulum is in the offing.
4. 3 REPORT OP THE ROYAL CommIssIox ON TAXATION, supra note 3, at 122-24.
5. For the special case of the two-job married couple, see notes 117-45 infra and accompanying
text.
6. A representative illustration of this theme, which was accepted by judges with the same en-
thusiasm as by tax theorists and administrators, is Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (5940):
"We have here at best a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group.... It is
hard to imagine that respondent [the transferor] felt himself the poorer after this trust had been
executed or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact." Of course, this conclusion may
well have been justified, but despite its tough realism, transfers with no strings attached have been
customarily accepted at face value, even though the transferor might feel no poorer after making
a gift "within an intimate family group."
7. See C. SHOUP, Fyn-atAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxEs 21-25,32-49 (1965).
[VOL 27: Page 13891394
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Since 1948, however, the Internal Revenue Code has imposed the same
liability on all equal-income married couples, whether the combined in-
come is generated by the earnings or investments of one spouse or both
and without regard to the division of ownership between them. So long
as family harmony prevails, equal-income married couples can purchase
equal quantities of goods and services and probably make their eco-
nomic decisions in a substantially identical fashion. These common char-
acteristics have been regarded by most theorists as more important in fix-
ing the tax liability of equal-income married couples than differences in
their ownership of property, even though technical ownership may become
crucial if the marriage is dissolved. For this reason, the 1948 statutory prin-
ciple of equal taxes for equal-income married couples has been "almost
universally accepted" by tax theorists,8 except for suggestions that a two-
job married couple should not pay as much as a one-job married couple
with the same joint income.'
2. Tax-equality or marriage neutrality?
There is, however, a cloud on the horizon. It is increasingly argued
that the income tax on two persons who get married should be neither
more nor less than they paid on the same income before marriage. This call
for a marriage-neutral tax system stems sometimes from the conviction
that the state should neither encourage nor discourage marriage by a tax
incentive or penalty, and sometimes from a belief that ceremonial mar-
riages in today's society are not sufficiently different from informal alli-
ances to warrant a difference in tax liability. A legislative bill to achieve
a marriage-neutral federal income tax has gained a large and diverse Con-
gressional following in both the House of Representatives and the Senate."
Proponents of this reform, however, often overlook the fact that, given a
progressive rate schedule, a marriage-neutral tax system cannot be recon-
ciled with a regime of equal taxes for equal-income married couples.
This collision of objectives is easily illustrated. If we assume a rate
schedule taxing single persons at the rate of io percent on the first $ioooo
of income and 25 percent on amounts above $ioooo, the taxes paid by four
unmarried persons on the amounts of taxable income set out in Table i
would be as shown therein.
If Alpha marries Beta and Theta marries Zeta, and all four continue
to earn the same amount of income as before marriage, the consolidated
8. J. P~cmANw, FEDEFRAL TAx POLICY 87-88 (rev. ed. 197).
9. See notes i17-45 infra and accompanying text.
so. H.R. 75, 93 d Cong., ist Sess. (1973). For hearings on this bill and its predecessors see
Hearings on Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Work-
ing, Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as
1972 House Hearings]. For discussion of H.R. 715 see note 136 infra.
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TABLE 1







income of each married couple will be $2oooo. If their marriage is to have
no effect on their tax liabilities, Alpha-Beta should continue to pay a total
of $2,ooo and Theta-Zeta a total of $2,900 in taxes. But if this difference in
their tax burdens is deemed to be unwarranted, and a new rate schedule is
prescribed for married couples that will cause Alpha-Beta and Theta-Zeta
to pay the same tax since they have the same joint income ($2oooo), mar-
riage will either (i) decrease the tax burden for both couples, (2) decrease
it for one and leave the other's unchanged, (3) decrease it for one and
increase it for the other, (4) increase it for one and leave the other's un-
changed, or (5) increase it for both-depending on the rate schedule appli-
cable to married couples. In tabular form, using the couples described in
Table i, these possibilities are as shown in Table 2.
In short, we cannot simultaneously have (a) progression, (b) equal
taxes on equal-income married couples, and (c) a marriage-neutral tax
burden.1 A corollary of this conclusion is that a tax system with a progres-
sive rate schedule can be marriage-neutral if individual legal rights over
income and property are controlling even after marriage and each spouse
reports his or her own income, but not if the tax is based on the couple's
consolidated income.
For these reasons, advocacy of a marriage-neutral tax system collides
directly and irretrievably with a dominant theme of tax theory for at least
5o years-the irrelevance of ownership within intimate family groups.
This principle, together with its implication that taxpaying capacity is best
measured by consolidated marital or family income, not only has been reg-
ularly expounded in the scholarly literature and preached in the classroom,
but also has been a major influence on Congress and the judiciary. As will
be seen, however, these ideas at one time had powerful challengers, who
may belatedly come to be honored as unsung heroes if today's advocates
of a marriage-neutral tax system carry the day.
.i. It should be noted that this dilemma, as demonstrated by Table 2, arises even when two-job
married couples are compared with each other; it is not restricted to the effect of marriage when only
one spouse is gainfully employed outside the home.
1396 [Vol. 27: Page 1389
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TABLE 2
EFFEcT oF MAIAtAGE oN TAxEs
'397
Marriage Will Have the Following Effect
If the Tax on Married Couples with on the Tax Burden Shown in Table 1:
$20,000 of Taxable Income Is: Alpha-Beta Theta-Zeta
1. Less than $2,000 Decrease Decrease
2. $2,000 No change Decrease
3. More than $2,000 but less than $2,900 Increase Decrease
4. $2,900 Increase No change
5. More than $2,900 Increase Increase
3. The income of children.
Returning to the Canadian Royal Commission's rationale for taxing
families on their consolidated income, it will be recalled that the Commis-
sion advocated consolidation of the income of children as well as the in-
come of spouses. 2 In a society whose children are expected to work and to
contribute their earnings to the family pool without voicing any opinions
on the way funds are used, the case for consolidation is strongest. But even
in a society that accords more financial independence to children, their
earnings affect the economic behavior of the parents; as the children's in-
come grows, the parents are relieved of pressure to support the children
currently and to pass on an inheritance to them. The larger the aggregate
pool of resources, it is argued, the greater the group's capacity to pay taxes.
The theory is not without appeal. But the justification for consolidating
family income is not "tax logic," or any other factors peculiar to the tax
system, but rather a social phenomenon-more precisely, the observer's
perception of social realities. The Canadian Royal Commission itself im-
plicitly acknowledged this by proposing a series of limits to the inclusion
of children's income in the family's consolidated tax base l First, consoli-
dation was to be compulsory only if the children were minors or disabled.
Other children, whether living with their parents or not, were excluded,
except that students between 21 and 25 years of age could elect to have their
income included in the family tax base. Moreover, minors over the school-
leaving age could elect to be excluded if employed and living apart from
their parents. Finally, regardless of a child's age, gifts and bequests received
by him (which were to be included in taxable income under another Com-
mission proposal) could be deposited in an "Income Adjustment Account,"
a quasi-trust device for holding the property intact until the child's de-
12. 3 REPORT oF Tnm RoYAL CoinSssio ON TAxATION, supra note 3, at 123-24.
13. Id. at 132-34.
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parture from the family unit (usually at 21) and taxing the accumulated
income to him at that time. This exception to consolidation was evidently
confined by the Commission to property acquired by gift or bequest in the
belief that such property is more likely to be treated as sacrosanct by the
parents than would be the child's personal earnings. If so, we have one more
illustration of the pervasive influence of social customs-actual or perceived
-on the tax system.
These exceptions to the principle of consolidation acknowledge that
children should eventually be regarded as autonomous persons whose tax-
paying capacity is independent of their parents. Other draftsmen might
draw the line elsewhere, but presumably even the most committed pro-
ponent of consolidation would abandon it at some point-whether it be
when children reach 18 or 21, become self-supporting, leave the parents'
home, get married, or have children of their own.
4. Defining the group whose income is to be consolidated.
If income is to be consolidated, the entity subject to this treatment must
be defined, e.g., "married couple," "family," "household," etc. Sociologists
may find it useful to study groups that engage in joint decisionmaking or
that manifest a common interest in the economic well-being of their mem-
bers, but it would be difficult if not impossible to administer a law that
employed such squishy phrases." Any more precise definition, however,
will inevitably exclude groups that are only marginally different, so far as
relevant economic or social relationships are concerned, from those within
the magic circle. If married couples are taxed on their consolidated in-
come, for example, should the same principle extend to a child who sup-
ports an aged parent, two sisters who share an apartment, or a divorced
parent who lives with an adolescent child? Should a relationship established
by blood or marriage be demanded, to the exclusion, for example, of un-
14. In recent years draftsmen and administrators of social welfare programs have wrestled con-
tinually with the problem of defining family and household units. See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), where a statute that defined a household eligible for
federal food stamps as "a group of related individuals, who . . . are living as one economic unit
sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common" was held
to be unconstitutional as a discrimination against households containing unrelated individuals. See
also Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (S. & E.D.N.Y. X974) (reduction of welfare allowance
based on presence of a "lodger" in household is unconstitutional); Klein, supra note i, at 388 (dis-
cussing constitutionality of statutory rules based on the permanence of a sexual liaison between two
unmarried persons, describing the California concept of a "man assuming the role of spouse"
("MARS"), and referring to "spouselike persons"); Lerman, The Family, Poverty and Welfare Pro-
grams: An Introductory Essay on Problems of Analysis and Policy, in SuBcoMts. ON FISCAL POLICY OF
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SasS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFA E, PAPER 12, PART I, THE
FAMILY, POVERTY, AND WELFARE PROGRAMS: FACTORS INFLUENCING FAMILY INsTABILITY (Comm.
Print 1974).
For discussions of the relationship of family and household patterns to public welfare programs,
see id., pt. II, at 181.
[Vol. 27: Page 13891398
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married persons who live together, homosexual companions, and com-
munes?
The most objective boundary lines are those based on legal character-
istics such as marital status, obligation to support, or right to inherit. Under
existing law, the principal determinant of the tax burden is marriage, a
status that is usually unambiguous." In a society that increasingly questions
the legitimacy of traditional legal distinctions, however, one is tempted to
substitute social "realities" in defining the boundaries of the group whose
income is to be consolidated. But every departure from readily established
definitional lines increases the problem of enforcement. If the tax on two
unmarried persons depends on whether they live together, for example,
how is their status to be verified by the Internal Revenue Service without
an intolerable intrusion into their private lives ?1" The attempt of social
workers to apply the "man in the house" rule to deny welfare payments
suggests the difficulties that would be encountered by the Internal Revenue
Service in auditing claims that taxpayers are, or are not, living together."'
[f the assertions of status on tax returns were taken at face value in order
to minimize or eliminate costly and abrasive investigations, the revenue
loss resulting from improper claims might be very large; perhaps more im-
portant, conscientious taxpayers would be offended by the government's
refusal to enforce its own rules against others. For these reasons, it does not
seem feasible to consolidate the income of a group unless its boundaries
can be crisply defined and readily verified.
B. The Realm of Practice-.r9z3 to 1948
Turning from theory to practice, we find that the tension between the
"individual" and "family unit" approaches to federal taxation has had a
tortuous history since 1913, when the sixteenth amendment was ratified.
The twists and turns in legislative, judicial, and administrative practices
provide abundant evidence of the inevitable conflict of values that attend
any statutory decision in this area. So much light is cast on current issues
by this history that an examination in moderate depth of the principal lines
of development is warranted, if not unavoidable.
15. The principal source of ambiguity in ascertaining marital status is an out-of-state divorce of
debatable validity. See, e.g., Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
z6. In Sweden, we are told, the social and legal lines between marriage and informal cohabita-
tion have become quite hazy, but unmarried persons who live together are treated as a tax unit only
if they were previously married (in which event the dissolution of their marriage is a suspect "tax
divorce") or have borne children. See Sundberg, Marriage or No Marriage: The Directives for the
Revision of Swedish Family Law, 2o INT'L & Comp. L.J. 223 (1971). To aid the enforcement of these
proviions, Swedish taxpayers must state annually in their tax returns whether they are living with an-
other person. See id. at 223.
17. See note 14 supra.
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i. The early statutes and the courts: Lucas v. Earl.
Despite the all but universal preference of theoreticians for the consoli-
dation of family income, the tax legislation enacted by Congress was domi-
nated by an individualistic approach at the outset. This focus on individuals
rather than married couples, families, or households was implicit as early
as 1913, when the introductory words of the first taxing statute based on the
sixteenth amendment imposed a tax "upon the entire net income arising
or accruing from all sources . . .to every citizen of the United States ...
and to every person residing in the United States, though not a citizen
thereof."' 8 The Revenue Act of i916 made the point explicit by taxing "the
entire net income received ... by every individual."'9 The right of mar-
ried couples to file a joint return (first recognized by statute in 1918) was
not an exception to this individualistic bias, since the same rate schedule
applied to both separate and joint returns, with the result that joint filings
were disadvantageous except in unusual circumstances."
This early Congressional decision to tax individuals rather than fam-
ilies2 was buttressed by a series of judicial decisions-whose importance
in the development of the federal tax system can hardly be exaggerated-
holding that a taxpayer who earns or is otherwise entitled to receive income
cannot assign it, for tax purposes, to another taxpayer, even if the transfer
is effective under state law. The leading case, Lucas v. Earl," involved an
agreement between husband and wife for an equal division between them
of all earnings, investment income, gifts, and other receipts during their
marriage. The agreement was executed in i9oI and hence was innocent
of a tax avoidance objective. Despite this, the Supreme Court held in a
much-quoted opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes that the husband was taxable
on the full amount of his personal service income:
[Tihis case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import
and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute
x8. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. I6, § H(A) (W), 38 Stat. 166.
x9. Ch. 463, § i(a), 39 Star. 756. The 1894 Income Tax Law placed a similar emphasis on in-
dividuals: "[A tax] shall be assessed . . . upon the gains, profits, and income received . . . by
every citizen . . . and every person residing . .. .. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Star.
553. So did the income tax law of the Civil War era: ". . . there shall be levied ...upon the an-
nual . . . income of every person residing . . . .. Act of July i, x862, ch. 19, § 9o, x72 Stat. 473.
2o. A joint return could increase a generous couple's deductions for charitable contributions by
increasing their adjusted gross income and hence raising the deduction ceiling which is determined
by a percentage of adjusted gross income. See also Helvering v. Janney, 31x U.S. 189 (1940) (capital
losses of one spouse deductible from capital gains of other spouse in computing "aggregate income!'
on pre-1948 joint return).
21. At one time, the legislative decision against consolidation may have stemmed from doubts
about its constitutionality. See H.R. RaP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. x7-22 (1941), reprlinted
in 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 413, 427-31; Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 2o6 (X931); Paul &
Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax, 5 B'sxL L. REv. 241, 266-71 (1936).
22. 281 U.S. iIX (1930). The taxpayers were domiciled in California; however, during the
taxable years involved, the California community property system did not confer a sufficient interest
on the wife to permit her to report half the husband's earnings on her separate return. See note 44
infra and accompanying text.
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could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not
be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who
earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement
by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew.2
3
Under Lucas v. Earl, it became virtually impossible for a taxpayer with in-
come from wages, salaries, or professional fees to shift these items to other
taxpayers such as a spouse or child.
But dividends, interest, rents, and other forms of investment income
were affected very differently by Lucas v. Earl than income from personal
services. The "tree" (to use Justice Holmes' metaphor) that produces in-
vestment income, according to the courts, was the underlying property
itself, so that the income is taxable to the person owning the property when
the income arises. Thus, taxpayers wanting to shift the tax liability for in-
vestment income to their spouses or children found it possible to do so with
impunity, if they were prepared to give up ownership of the underlying
securities, bank account, rental real estate, or other property In essence,
legal ownership of the property came to be controlling, no matter how
strong the emotional ties between the donor and donee.
2. What might have been: a tax world without Lucas v. Earl?
The opinion in Lucas v. Earl is late-vintage Holmes, magisterial in tone,
studded with quotable phrases, " and devoid of analysis. It is by now so
entrenched in the thought of tax experts that an income tax system without
Lucas v. Earl is hard to imagine, rather like envisioning the English lan-
guage without Shakespeare or the King James translation of the Bible. But
the effort is worth making, since it will help to expose some half-hidden
premises in the tax treatment of family income.
What if the Supreme Court had thought that the language of the statute
and the "intent" of Congress, both murky at best, required the husband-
wife agreement (whose validity in determining their property rights under
state law was acknowledged) to be honored for tax purposes as well?
Assuming Congressional acquiescence in this result, married couples would
then have been able to split their income for both private and tax purposes,
23. 281 U.S. at 114-r5.
24. If a taxpayer balked at a complete divestiture of ownership, a partial transfer would some-
times suffice. The tortuous and often hazy statutory, judicial, and administrative boundaries between
effective and ineffective transfers are, of course, a major subject of inquiry in law school courses in
federal income taxation.
25. The credit for "giving rise to a truly lamentable host of horticultural metaphors," assigned
by Molloy to Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), actually belongs to Lucas v. Earl. See Molloy,
Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind, 6 TAx L. Rav. 57, 61 (195o).
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and all equal-income married couples making this election would have
paid the same amount of federal income taxes. As an objective of federal
tax policy, this result of equal taxes on equal-income married couples has
been widely approved by tax theorists,)" yet the effort of Mr. and Mrs. Earl
to achieve a tax burden that was independent of their proportionate contri-
butions to their joint income was repulsed by Lucas v. Earl, and generations
of law students have been led to applaud the decision.
Mr. and Mrs. Earl were prophets without honor in another respect. By
establishing for themselves a marital regime of equal ownership and equal
control of their joint income in 19oi, they foreshadowed an idea that con-
temporary women's rights advocates often present as novel, and that many
regard as worthy of being imposed by law on all married couples. More-
over, it was only by equalizing their financial positions that they put them-
selves in a position to claim the tax advantage of equal-income separate
returns. Though their tax claim was rejected, the income-splitting joint
return authorized by Congress in 1948, which with only minor changes
is still in effect, achieves the tax result that Mr. and Mrs. Earl were seeking.
It does so, however, without requiring husband and wife to equalize their
ownership inter se; in this respect, the Earl agreement might be regarded
as an improvement over the 1948 statutory reform. 7 In retrospect, therefore,
it is not fanciful to suggest that the taxpayers in Lucas v. Earl might well
have been praised for an agreement embodying a sound principle of
marital partnership that, had it been upheld, would have furthered an
equally sound principle of tax law, instead of being castigated for seeking
refuge in what Mr. Justice Holmes called "attenuated subtleties."
The Supreme Court is nothing if not supreme, however, and the Holms-
ian epigrams in Lucas v. Earl carried the day. The propriety of the decision
became an article of faith with tax theorists, 8 and it soon was regarded as a
guardian of the progressive rate structure. In fact, however, the judgment
of the court of appeals, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, was
equally compatible with any desired degree of progression. To illustrate
this point, assume a rate schedule that exempts the first $iooooo of income
and taxes all income above that level at ioo percent. Under Lucas v. Earl as
decided, a married breadwinner would become subject to the ioo percent
rate as soon as his or her salary exceeded $ioo,ooo, which is the same point at
which a single person would become subject to the ioo percent rate. Had
26. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
27. For proposals to accord federal tax effect to "marital partnerships" established by married
couples in common law states to create property rights similar to those arising in community property
states, see H.R. 3842, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947), reprinted in Hearings on Revenue Revisions Before
the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 8oth Cong., ist Sess., 762 (1947); Altman, Community Prop-
erty: Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in the Revenue Act, 16 TaxFs 138 (1938).
28. I do not exculpate myself for worshiping false gods.
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Lucas v. Earl gone the other way, a married couple would become subject
to the ioo percent rate only if their aggregate income exceeded $200,000; the
first $200,o0o would be exempt, but this is the same amount that two single
persons could enjoy tax-free if each had a salary of $iooooo.
Which approach serves the cause of progression better depends on one's
views about the relationship between a married couple's tax burden and the
tax burden of single persons with the same amount of income. If the best
reference point is the tax paid by two single persons of whom one has the
same income as the husband and the other the same income as the wife-
the Lucas v. Earl result-then that case "protects" the progressive rate sched-
ule. But if the married couple's taxpaying capacity is more nearly compa-
rable to that of two single persons each with one-half their income, Lucas v.
Earl makes no contribution to-indeed, interferes with-the achievement
of progression. There is nothing in the principle of progression that re-
quires taxpaying capacity to be determined by looking to the source of
income, in disregard of the fact that it is shared by a married couple or
family. For this reason, the common notion that the principle of Lucas v.
Earl, as applied to married couples,2" was an essential buttress to the pro-
gressive rate schedule is fallacious.
A final aspect of Lucas v. Earl's exaggerated reputation as a guardian
of progression has served to obscure its responsibility for an objectionable
distinction between earned and investment income. When Lucas v. Earl
was decided, it was already established law that taxpayers with investment
income could make intrafamily gifts that would be effective in computing
their federal tax liability, if they were willing to relinquish control over the
underlying income-producing property." Against this background, Lucas
v. Earl imposed a disability on wage earners and salaried taxpayers"'
that cannot be easily reconciled with a concern for progression. To the
contrary, if income splitting had been made as freely available to them as
to taxpayers with investment income, the result would have been a tax
structure whose progressive rates-at whatever level Congress chose to fix
them-would have applied more equitably as between married couples
with earned income and married couples with an equal amount of invest-
ment income. This disparity between earned and investment income per-
sisted until the enactment in 1948 of the income-splitting joint return.
29. As applied outside the family context (e.g., to prevent the shifting of income from a tax-
payer to trusts, corporations, or other entities in which he has a beneficial interest), however, Lucas v.
Earl clearly serves to protect progressivity.
3o. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
31. Sole proprietors and partners in business firms, whose personal service income is mingled
with income from invested capital, are less restricted by Lucas v. Earl. Despite its rejection of "atten-
uated subtleties," the decision did not automatically negate the effectiveness of partnership and close
corporation arrangements between taxpayers active in the business and their spouses or children, and
these devices are often honored by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
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Finally, in retrospect one can discern still another irony in Lucas v. Earl.
In holding that the marital partnership established by Mr. and Mrs. Earl
was an "anticipatory arrangement" that for tax purposes could not be
allowed to override the fact that under private law the husband's salary
vested in him as soon as the services were performed, it simply gave prece-
dence to one "anticipatory arrangement" (the employer-employee con-
tract) over another (the husband-wife contract), on the ground that the
first had taken hold an instant before the second. 2 This may have been a
reasonable reading of a murky statute, but in making policy, there is no
valid reason to allow the time when their legal rights vested to determine
whether the husband or the wife should be taxed on the income in question.
Moreover, although Lucas v. Earl did not explicitly denigrate the husband-
wife contract as a "bedchamber" reshuffling of legal rights, it was taken
to imply that such arrangements should be viewed with suspicion because
legal rights within the family unit are inconsequential."3 But if their re-
shuffling of legal rights is to be disregarded, why attach any greater im-
portance to the original division of ownership between husband and wife?
Should not equal-income couples pay the same tax, regardless of how their
legal rights are originally allocated or subsequently rearranged between
them? Congress answered this question in the affirmative in 1948, and the
seeds of this legislative decision were buried in Lucas v. Earl, even though
it held that the statute before it required a negative answer to the same
question.
3. The community property system: Poe v. Seaborn.
Individualism thus came to reign supreme in the formative years of fed-
eral income taxation in the sense that every individual was taxed on his or
her "own" income. In states with a common law property system, the result
was that the taxes paid by married couples with equal amounts of aggregate
income varied greatly, depending on whether their investment income was
divided between them or not and, in the case of personal service income,
on whether there was one breadwinner or two. In the community property
states of the Southwest and Pacific Coast, however, where marriage is
treated as a partnership that vests in each spouse a present interest in one-
half of the couple's joint income, whether derived from personal services
or from their community property, tax equality of equal-income married
32. This reading of Lucas v. Earl is confirmed by the same Court's unanimous decision in
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 1o (1930), that the husband's earnings in a community property state
are, in effect, already subjected to the wife's one-half interest when the salary is paid to him. In a
community property state, in other words, the marriage agreement causes the wife's rights to vest
before the salary is paid and any contrary employer-employee agreement comes too late; in a common
law state, the husband-wife and employer-employee contracts are given just the opposite order of
precedence.
33. See note 6 supra.
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couples came to be the prevailing principle8 But this result was reached
only after the Treasury and the courts fumbled uncertainly for many years
with the proper treatment of community income. Were wages, for example,
to be reported by the wage earner, or one-half by each spouse? If personal
service income was invested, who should report the subsequently received
dividends, interest, and rents? These questions first arose in 1913,"5 but
they were not definitively answered until x93o, when the Supreme Court
held in Poe v. Seaborn" that each spouse was taxable on one-half of the
community income.
Until then, the Treasury had to fend for itself in administering a taxing
statute that referred vaguely to "the net income of each individual" but that
had to be applied in states whose community property systems give the wife
a "present interest" in one-half of the community income, but vest the hus-
band with the exclusive right to manage the property free from any duty
to account for his stewardship while the marriage lasts.8" His managerial
powers amount to something less than full ownership of the community
income, of course, but even in common law states the husband's "own"
income is burdened by legal restrictions, including a duty to support his
wife during marriage, make proper provision for her on divorce, and trans-
fer a specified part of his estate to her if she survives him.38
When debating the tax significance of these legal differences between
the community property and common law systems, the commentators were
usually overwhelmed by their own rhetoric. Thus, the community property
system was extolled as "a heritage of the great free peoples," to be contrasted
with a common law system that treated women as "inferior beings, entitled
only to a subordinate place in the social order" and that owed its origin
"to the fact that Scandinavian pirates, descending on the coasts of France,
adapted to their use a code of marital property laws deemed appropriate
to the daughters of the vanquished" and then imposed it on the English
after the Norman Conquest."3 Denying that this contrast between civiliza-
tion and barbarism is helpful in creating a tax structure for the twentieth
34. Local law left room for "separate" income, which was taxable to one spouse or the other
in the same way that he or she would be taxed in a common law state, but these items (e.g., income
excluded from the community by agreement between the spouses, and some receipts during marriage
that under state law did not become community income) were ordinarily of minor importance.
35. The question could also have arisen under the Civil War and 1894 Income Tax Acts which
were based on individual income, see note i9 supra, but the modest rates made the issue rather un-
important.
36. 282 U.S. 1o (193o).
37. See, e.g., ch. x6o8, §8, [x969] Cal. Laws 3342 (amended 1973). Prior to the 1973 amend-
ment, which did not take effect until 1975, the husband was vested with the right to manage and con-
trol the community property. The amendment gave both spouses equal powers of control. See CAL.
Civ. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1974).
38. These gender-based obligations may now or in the future be matched by correlative ob-
ligations on the wife but they were unique to the husband during the period under examination here.
39. Brief for Atty's General of Calif., Ariz., Idaho, La., Nev., N.M., Tex., & Wash. as Amid
Curiae at 62, 67-69, 71-72, Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (945).
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century, other commentators argued that the "marital partnership" recog-
nized by the community property states is without significance while the
marriage lasts, because of the husband's broad managerial powers, and that
"the wife's role is essentially that of a back-seat driver who may carp and
criticize, but may not take the wheel."4 The Supreme Court, for its part,
has described the husband's authority as an "expansive and sometimes
profitable control over the wife's share" terminating only on his death, so
that it is only then that she gains "full and exclusive possession, control
and enjoyment" of her share of the community property.4
The husband's broad power to manage all community property led the
Treasury, in its first ruling on the subject, to require him to report all com-
munity income."' In i919, however, the Treasury beat a partial retreat
from this theory by acknowledging the couple's right to split investment
income from community property on separate tax returns, while continuing
to require the husband to report all community income generated by the
personal services of either spouse. This position was, in turn, abandoned
when the Attorney General ruled in 192o and 1921 that the community
property systems of Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington gave the wife a "vested interest" in one-half of all
community income, and that each spouse was therefore taxable on his or
her share. As to California, however, the Attorney General ruled that the
wife had only "a mere expectancy" under local law, rather than a vested
interest. 43
The exclusion of California from the Attorney General's protaxpayer
opinion was upheld in 1926 by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Robbins.4 The Court accepted the government's theory that the wife had
no more than "a mere expectancy" in California community property, but
also went on to intimate that there was a broader ground for taxing the
husband, viz., the fact that "he may spend [community income] substan-
tially as he chooses," even "if he wastes it in debauchery."4" This language
was interpreted by the Treasury as an invitation to reexamine the status of
community income in even the most orthodox community property states,
and the Attorney General cleared the road for a series of test cases by re-
considering and withdrawing his 192o and 1921 opinions. While not con-
40. 1 R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 55 (1942).
41. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 355 (1945).
42. See Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax, 14 CALIF. L. Rtv. 351, 354-
57 (1926).
43. See id. at 356-57.
44. 269 U.S. 315 (1926). The Court reserved judgment on the effect of a 1917 revision of Cali-
fornia law intended to insure favorable federal tax treatment. Further changes in 1927 (providing that
husband and wife have "present, existing, and equal interests [in community property] under the
management and control of the husband") finally succeeded in bringing California into the circle of
"true" community property states. See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
45. 269 U.S. at 327.
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ceding that these opinions were erroneous, the Attorney General expressed
the view that the community property systems in some of these states bore
a close resemblance to the California system that had just been held in-
effective in the Robbins case, while others differed considerably from it;
therefore, he withdrew the earlier opinions, so that the issue could be sub-
mitted by the Treasury to the courts."
Three years later, Poe v. Seaborn and three companion cases4" reached
the Supreme Court, and-17 years after the issue first arose-finally elicited
an authoritative judicial resolution of the community property imbroglio.
The government summarized its argument for taxing all community in-
come to the husband in these words:
The wife's vested interest in the community property is no more than a right
to devise by will or to receive upon the dissolution of the community one-half
of the then existing community property with the right in the interim to have
the property devoted to such purposes as are in the honest judgment of the hus-
band appropriate for the advancement of community interests. She has no positive
powers of control and cannot, to any substantial degree, interfere with the broad
powers of control given to her husband.
The husband accordingly is the spouse having the right to control and man-
age the community property in Washington [the state of residence in Poe v.
Seaborn] and should be made liable for Federal income tax on the entire com-
munity income. This requirement is the more reasonable in view of the fact that
under the philosophy of the community property system in that State the com-
munity is a legal unit and in view of the further fact that the husband as well as
the community is liable on all contracts which he makes for the community.""
Whether by design or accident, none of the four test cases involved com-
munity income attributable to the wife's personal services, but the govern-
ment's theory would have taxed even this type of income to the husband,
along with his own earnings and any income from the investment of com-
munity property.
The government's argument, however, did not carry the day. After re-
viewing the legal incidents of community property in Washington, where
the taxpayers in Poe v. Seaborn were domiciled, the Court held that, despite
the husband's managerial control, "the entire property and income of the
community can no more be said to be that of the husband, than it could
rightly be termed that of the wife."4" The Robbins case was distinguished,
as based on peculiarities of California law. Buttressing its conclusion with
references to the legislative history of the taxing statutes, the Court con-
46. 35 Op. A'r'y GNr¢. 265 (1927). See also I. T. 2457, VIII-I CM. BULL. 89 (1929)
47. Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 1x8 (1930) (Arizona); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930)
(Texas); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. .27 (1930) (Louisiana).
48. Brief for Appellee at 8, Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. IOX (930).
49. 282 U.S. at 113.
5o. See id. at i16.
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cluded that one-half of the community income was taxable to each spouse.
On the same day the Court reached the same result for Arizona, Texas, and
Louisiana (the states involved in the three other test cases), 1 and the In-
ternal Revenue Service promptly added Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico
to the list of recognized community property states. 2
Following Poe v. Seaborn, the tax status of a married couple in a com-
munity property state differed from that of a married couple in a common
law state in two fundamental ways. First, each community property spouse
paid the same tax as an unmarried person with one-half the aggregate
community income. This result obtained in common law states only in the
unusual case of a married couple whose income was earned or received
in equal amounts by each spouse. A corollary of this geographical disparity
was that marriage usually reduced (and divorce increased) a couple's
income taxes if they resided in a community property state' but were
neutral tax events for couples in common law states. Second, the federal
tax burden for equal-income married couples was identical in community
property states, whether the income was attributable to one spouse or to
both. In common law states, by contrast, the tax liability of equal-income
married couples could vary widely, since it depended on the amount attrib-
utable to each spouse.
4. The 1941 defeat of mandatory joint returns.
Its assault in the courts on the tax advantages of community property
having been conclusively repulsed in Poe v. Seaborn, the Treasury turned
to the legislative arena. Indecisive preliminary skirmishes in 1933, 1934,
and 1937" were followed by a full-scale battle in i94i, when the Treasury
persuaded the House Committee on Ways and Means to recommend en-
actment of a provision for mandatory joint returns, designed to eliminate
the geographical disparity between the community property and common
law states by equalizing the tax on married couples with the same aggregate
income."
5x. See note 47 supra.
52. See Mi. 3 85 3 , X-i Cum. BULL. 139 (1930).
53. In an echo of Poe v. Seaborn, the Supreme Court held in 1971 that a community property
spouse was taxable on her half of the community income, even if she was "not really aware of the
community tax situation, and not really in a position to ascertain the details of the community in-
come." United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (197x). The traditional forensic roles of tax-
payer and government were reversed in this case, where the taxpayer sought to minimize and the
government to magnify the importance of her community property rights. A legislative remedy for
the tax-avoider's innocent spouse was provided by the enactment in 1971 of §§ 6013(e) and 6653 (b)(last sentence) to the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited by section). See also § 985 (citizen
married to nonresident alien may "elect out' of foreign community property laws); for background
of this election, see 3 J. MmTFNs, LAw o1 FanRm. INcozm TAXATION § 19.32a (5942).
54. See Thorson Dissertation, supra note x, at 57-58.
55. See H.R. Rrp. No. X040, supra note 21.
Mandatory joint returns would also have had an important impact within the common law
states, where they would have equalized the tax paid by couples with investment income, who were
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The most explosive feature of the House Committee's 1941 recommen-
dation was the imposition of the same tax on a married couple's con-
solidated income as on a single person with the same amount of income.
This aspect of the 1941 proposal would have meant an increase in the tax
burden for almost all married couples in community property states, as
well as for couples in common law states if both spouses had income from
personal services or investments. Conversely, two unmarried taxpayers with
separate sources of income would have to pay a heavier tax if they got
married than if they lived together without benefit of clergy, and many
married couples would be able to reduce their tax burden by getting
divorced. Quite naturally, therefore, opponents of the proposal assailed it
as "a tax on morality.""s
The House Committee on Ways and Means sought to disarm this criti-
cism in advance by solemnly announcing:
It is not believed that the joint return will result in any increase in the divorce
rate in the United States or adversely affect the morals of American families. A
compulsory joint return in Great Britain has been required since 1914, and their
divorce rate is not as high as in the United States.
The rate of divorces by each i,ooo of population in 1935 was, in the United
States, 1.71 percent as against o.io percent in England and Wales. The number
of divorces for each thousand marriages was, in 1935, in the United States, 164
divorces for each i,ooo marriages, in England and Wales, 12 divorces for each
i,ooo marriages. 7
able to split their income by intraspousal gifts of income-producing property, with the tax on
couples with earned income, who had been barred by Lucas v. Earl from splitting their income for
tax purposes. Cf. notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
The term "mandatory joint return" is ambiguous; as envisioned in 1941, the plan required hus-
bands and wives to apply to their joint income the same rate schedule that was used by single tax-
payers. The sting, therefore, resulted less from the proposed compulsory aggregation of marital in-
come than from the rate schedule, and it could have been increased, reduced, or eliminated by a
different rate schedule. The split-income plan enacted in 1948 included a favorable rate schedule for
joint returns; joint returns were optional in theory, but the new rate schedule was an offer "that
could not be refused" (except in special circumstances, see notes 78-79 infra and accompanying text),
and this meant that joint returns became mandatory in fact for almost all married couples. See notes
67-77 infra and accompanying text. The same carrot-and-stick approach is employed by the reform
proposed by Pechman; married couples would not be compelled to file joint returns, but an unfavor-
able rate schedule for married couples filing separate returns would make the filing of such returns
costly unless their income was equally divided. See Pechman, supra note i. Because the usage is so
widespread, I have used the term "mandatory joint return" to refer to marital aggregation combined
with an unfavorable rate schedule.
56. Any structural provision that increases the taxes paid by two single persons if they get
married can be described as a "marriage penalty;' unless the same burden will be imposed on them
if they cohabit without benefit of clergy. Since the latter measure is not politically likely, constitu-
tional, or enforceable, but see Sweden's example supra note I6, a "marriage penalty" can also be
termed "a tax on morality" or "a subsidy to sin." Publicists have not refrained from using these
colorful terms. See 1972 House Hearings, supra note io, at 153 (testimony of Oscar Gray). Op-
position to mandatory joint returns that impose a heavier burden on married couples than is
borne by two single taxpayers with the same aggregate income is not confined to American taxpayers.
British tax law consolidating marital income was vigorously attacked from a socialist perspective in
Webb, A Revolution in the Income Tax, in How 'To PAY FOR HEM WAR 233 (1916), with the same
rhetoric: "Legal matrimony would become prohibitive. A substantial premium would even be put
on desertion."
57. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77 th Cong., ist Sess. 14 (1941), 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 413, 424.
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Although the Committee did not explicitly say so, there was a more
effective way to defuse the "immorality" allegation than these fragmentary
statistics (which were not even limited to the taxpaying segments of each
country's population)-a separate rate schedule for joint returns under
which a married couple would pay twice the tax paid by a single person
with one-half the couple's income. But this was a costly way to protect
the institution of marriage, since it would have drastically cut the income
taxes paid by married couples in common law states. Though accepted in
1948, a tax reduction of this magnitude, given the government's insatiable
need for revenue on the eve of World War II, was not in the cards.
But neither, as quickly became apparent, was the mandatory joint re-
turn. The political response to the House Committee's proposal was tem-
pestuous:
Of course, the provision was "un-American." The contention was that by making
the marital relation a taxable privilege the "sly and tricky" provision was arbi-
trary and against public policy in that it struck at the institution of marriage,
was an attack upon the family, and promoted celibacy. The charge was that it
penalized fidelity and awarded perfidy. The argument continued into many other
aspects of this same general theme. It was asserted that the provision discouraged
marriage by young couples.
The [opponents of mandatory joint returns] became champions of emand-
pated womanhood. The provision was an encroachment on the independent status
and social, economic, and political individuality of women which had been won
only after a long, hard struggle. It revived the old common law fiction which made
the wife a chattel. Thus it was a step backward and contrary to the trend of
American policy, which more and more treated women on an absolute equality
with men. A famous phrase in a dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes came into
this argument. The provision brought back the horse and buggy days of i88o
when the legal pattern made the husband and wife one "and that one the hus-
band." It was also erroneously alleged that the provision took the money of one
person to pay the taxes of another, and that the provision upset the established
property laws of the sovereign community property states. In addition, many con-
gressmen argued that the provision was unconstitutional though there was little
doubt among fair-minded people that it would be upheld by the Supreme Court. s
Bowing to the storm, the House voted to eliminate the mandatory joint
return provision from the bill that became the Revenue Act of 1941. The
Senate Finance Committee then recommended a milder remedy, limited
to community income, taxing personal service income to the spouse who
earned it and investment income to the spouse entitled to manage and
58. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNrED STATEs 275 (1954). The tone of these references to the
status of married women has become more than a little jarring with the passage of time. A bit of
historical irony in Paul's final sentence is that he himself had expressed doubts about the constitu-
tionality of mandatory joint returns only 5 years earlier. See Paul & Havens, supra note 21, at
266-71.
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control it under local law. " This proposal, in turn, was rejected by the
Senate.
5. The spread of community property.
The income tax advantages of community property having come un-
scathed through these judicial and legislative battles,6" there was a stampede
at the state level to share in its benefits. Oklahoma-true to its sobriquet, the
"Sooner State"--had already started in 1939 by authorizing its married
citizens to elect to be governed by a newly enacted community property
system, and Oregon followed its lead by enacting a similar statute in 1943.
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court decided in Commissioner v. Har-
mon"5 that the Oklahoma and Oregon do-it-yourself laws were substantially
the same as the income-splitting contract between husband and wife that
was held to be ineffective for federal tax purposes in Lucas v. Earl. The
Court went on to announce that only a non-elective system of community
property, "made an incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of the
State," could qualify for income splitting under Poe v. Seaborn." As the
dissenting Justices (Douglas and Black) cogently argued, however, com-
munity property is an optional arrangement even in the original com-
munity property states, since it is dependent on the marital decision to live
in a community property state and to refrain from exercising the option,
available in most community property states, to hold all acquisitions during
marriage as separate rather than community property. 3 Thus, the result of
the Harmon case was that the community property system was effective
for federal income tax purposes if under local law the couple could "opt
out" of it, but not if they had to "opt in."
While it was easy for the scholar to ridicule Harmon's distinction be-
tween a condition precedent and a condition subsequent, it was almost as
easy for the legislator to sidestep its result with a new statute. Oklahoma and
Oregon promptly replaced their optional community property systems with
59. See S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-12, 36 (i94i), reprinted in 1941-2 Cum. BULL.
466, 474-76,494-95.
6o. The estate tax advantages of community property, however, were drastically cut back by
the Revenue Act of 1942, which required community property to be included in its entirety in the
estate of the first spouse to die, unless attributable to the surviving spouses personal services or
separate property and in any event taxed the first estate on the one-half subject to that spouse's testa-
mentary control. See Revenue Act of 1942 ch. 619, § 402, 56 Stat. 941, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 2, § 811 (e) 53 Stat. 122. The Supreme Court held the amendments constitutional in
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945). Similar changes were made in the gift tax. See Revenue
Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 453, 56 Stat. 953. These rules might have become the prototype of changes in
the income tax area, but they were repealed in 1948, when Congress authorized income splitting for
all married couples and concurrently enacted the estate and gift tax marital deductions. See S. REP.
No. ox3, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29, reprinted in 1948-I Curs. BULL. 285, 303-06. See also note 73
infra and accompanying text.
61. 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
62. Id. at 46.
63. Id. at 53-56. See Shoenhair v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 576 (1941), and cases there cited.
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mandatory ones, but neither tempted fate by going on to permit their mar-
ried citizens to elect out of the new law, despite the fact that the ostensibly
mandatory systems of some original community property states contained
this escape hatch. Their new statutes were later accepted as effective by the
Internal Revenue Service."' Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan, and Pennsyl-
vania soon joined the community property parade, and by 1948 a similar
step was under discussion in states as far removed from the civilizing mis-
sion of Spanish law as Massachusetts and New York." An influential New
York study warned that adoption of a community property system was
fraught with difficulties and urged that every effort be made to get a federal
solution, but it also recommended state self-help if Congress did not act
promptly."
C. 1948: The Optional Joint Return
The community property epidemic-which some enthusiasts praised as
a married women's liberation movement-forced Congress to confront,
once again, the problem of geographical disparity in the tax burdens borne
by married couples. But the range of legislative choice, viewed realistically,
was quite narrow. A revival of the remedy proposed by the House Ways
and Means Committee in 1941-a mandatory joint return, with the couple's
consolidated income taxed at the rate applicable to single persons-would
have invited a renewal of the old attack ("a tax on morality")."6 Moreover,
those who succeeded in defeating the proposal in 1941 would now have the
"new" community property states as allies in the legislative battle. The 1941
Senate Finance Committee's proposal" to tax community income to the
person who earned it was no more appealing; it too would invite opposition
from both old and new community property states, and it had the addi-
tional defect of focusing on personal service income, while leaving married
couples free to split their investment income by intraspousal gifts. A third
possibility for Congress was to do nothing, a strategy that would probably
have been followed by universal adoption of the community property sys-
tem at the state level, regardless of any local misgivings about its nontax
merits.
Instead of standing pat, Congress decided in 1948 to authorize all mar-
ried couples to aggregate their income and deductions on a joint return and
to pay a tax equal to twice what a single person would pay on one-half
64. See .T. 3782, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 84 (Oklahoma); I.T. 3743, 1945-I CoM. BUL. 142-43
(Oregon).
65. See Note, Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 Coitms. L.
Rav. 332 n.4 (195o) and statutes cited therein. Pennsylvania's statute was held unconstitutional in
Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947).
66. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE TAx COMISSION, 27-43 (New York 1947).
67. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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their consolidated taxable income." In its impact on the federal revenue,
this device was virtually the same as standing idly by while the whole
country adopted the community property system, but enactment of the
income-splitting joint return meant that the political credit for reducing
taxes was concentrated on Congress rather than dispersed among the state
legislatures.
Though the economic case for a massive tax reduction was not over-
whelmingly persuasive, the idea had great political support in 1948, and for
many the income-splitting joint return was an attractive device to effectuate
a reduction. Unlike an across-the-board cut in tax rates, the joint return
could be supported as a way of terminating both the historic disparity
between community property and common law states and the special op-
portunities for intraspousal income splitting that were available to married
couples with income-producing property. The Senate Finance Committee
offered this summary of the merits of the income-splitting joint return:
Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial geo-
graphical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes. The im-
petuous enactment of community-property legislation by States that have long
used the common law will be forestalled. The incentive for married couples in
common-law States to attempt the reduction of their taxes by the division of their
income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and family partnerships
will be reduced materially. Administrative difficulties stemming from the use
of such devices will be diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous
legislation on the income tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships. In effect,
these amendments represent the adoption of a new national system for ascertain-
ing Federal income tax liability. The adoption of these amendments will extend
substantial benefits to residents of both community-property and common-law
States. 70
Placing the legislative decision in a broader context, Surrey added this en-
dorsement:
If tax reduction of [great] magnitude was to be afforded [to middle and upper
bracket taxpayers], it was wise tax policy to use the dollars of tax reduction to
accomplish needed reform and build an improved tax structure. The best chance
for a more equitable and economically effective tax system lies in the intelligent
allocation of any tax reduction. The adoption of a presently acceptable solution
to the family income problem represents the one bright spot in the Revenue Act
of I948.71
69. A 1947 Treasury study paved the way for this legislative action and also canvassed the major
alternatives to the split-income plan. See Treasury Department, supra note i. The Treasury study, in
turn, was foreshadowed by a 1946 article by Surrey, supra note x, who was then Tax Legislative Coun-
sel to the Treasury, and the income-splitting proposal was frequently called the "Surrey Plan." See
Surrey, supra note i. As enacted, however, it did not embrace the income of minor children, although
this was recommended in Surrey's 1946 article. Id. at 986.
For a fuller discussion of the 1948 legislation, see Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The
Revenue Act of z948, 61 HAiv. L. REv. 7o97, io3-16 (1948).
70. S. REP. No. 7073, supra note 6o at 26.
71. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family supra note 69, at iio6.
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As anticipated, once the privilege of income splitting was extended to mar-
ried couples in common law states, the "new" community property states
lost their taste for Spanish law and repealed their statutes." The joint re-
turn became virtually universal for married couples, except for those too
hostile to cooperate in signing the return and for a few unusual situations in
which separate returns had minor residual advantages. '
At the time, the Revenue Act of 1948 seemed to have added a chapter
"[t]o the long history of the treatment of family income [that] is likely
to be the last for many years."7 In fact, new chapters were added by Con-
gress in 1951, 1954, and I969." Moreover, the basic 1948 decision to equalize
the tax burden on married couples with equal aggregate income has itself
come under attack recently, 6 though it was once widely thought to be
settled "for all time."7
D. Residual Separate Tax Treatment of Spouses After 1948
Although the allocation of most tax items as between husband and wife
became a matter of indifference with the consolidation of marital income
and deductions on the 1948 joint return, the statutory reform left intact
many "individualistic" elements of the tax law. Not only has the income of
children been insulated from aggregation,"' but many tax provisions con-
tinue to treat husband and wife as separate individuals even if they file a
joint return. Particularly noteworthy are a number of provisions with dollar
amount limitations. The $ioo dividend exclusion of section 1i6, for ex-
ample, is granted on a per-taxpayer basis. Since the exclusion is granted only
to taxpayers who receive dividends, the maximum allowance of $200 on
72. See Note, note 65 supra, at 337-47.
73. If income is divided about equally and one spouse incurs substantial medical expenses, sep-
arate returns may increase the medical expense deduction by reducing the 3% floor of § 213(a) (1).
See also § 152(e) (2), which may make separate returns preferable for some low-income taxpayers
because one (or even both) can then qualify as a dependent of a third person. Until the enactment of
§ i2ii(a)(2) in 1969, separate returns could be advantageous if both spouses had capital losses,
since $2,ooo of ordinary income could then be offset by their capital losses, while only $i,ooo could
be offset on a joint return.
74. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family, supra note 69, at 1104.
75. See notes 82-90 infra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 92-107 infra and accompanying text.
The 1947 Treasury study discusses at length the problem of aggregating the income of children
with that of their parents. See Treasury Department, supra note i, at 861-63.
77. Pechman, supra note I, at 475.
78. Indeed, Congress deliberately eschewed the aggregation of children's income with their
parents' even where consolidation would have been most appropriate and would almost certainly have
encountered no constitutional barrier, viz., the earnings of minor children in states vesting control
over such income in the parents, perhaps because aggregation was deemed politically unacceptable.
For example, a storm of protest ensued when New York sought, after 40 years of neglect, to enforce
a statute requiring parents to report their minor children's income from babysitting and similar
activities, which quickly led to a change in the law by a unanimous vote in the state legislature. See
Groves, supra note 3, at 112. Instead, in 1954 Congress explicitly renounced consolidation by en-
acting § 73 which taxes the child on such income rather than the parent. This rule achieved national
uniformity in the face of divergent state laws concerning a parent's entitlement to his child's income,
but the opposite rule--compulsory consolidation- would also have brought about uniformity.
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a joint return is automatically available for dividends that constitute com-
munity income, but in common law states it can be obtained only if each
spouse owns stock producing at least $ioo of dividends or if their stock
is owned jointly. Thus, the treatment of married couples under section ii6
varies with the legal division of ownership between the spouses. The reverse
is true of the additional first-year depreciation allowance of section I79,
whose limits are $io,ooo per year for single persons and $2oooo for married
couples filing a joint return, regardless of how ownership of the property
is divided between them. The larger allowance granted to married couples
by section x79 means that marriage can be advantageous and divorce dis-
advantageous, but all married couples are treated alike by section 179, since
legal ownership of the depreciable assets is not controlling. The $50,0o0
limit on the special tax rate on long-term capital gains, imposed by section
1201(b), functions in a more complex manner. Since the limit is identical
in amount for single persons and married couples, two individuals who con-
sistently realize more than $25,000 each of long-term capital gains will be
worse off if they get married and better off if they get divorced. But if one
consistently realizes capital gains in years when the other realizes losses
(e.g., $iooooo of gains for one and $50,000 of losses for the other), the right
to offset gains and losses on a joint return will improve their position, while
divorce will worsen it. Since the $50,ooo limit is the same for all taxpayers,
however, the treatment of married couples does not depend on the division
of legal ownership between them.79
Similar problems arise when a tax allowance is conditioned on the num-
ber of taxpayers involved in a particular activity. For example, a corporation
may not make a Subchapter S election if it has more than io shareholders.
Since stock held by husband and wife in joint ownership or as community
property is treated by section 1371 (c) as owned by one shareholder, a cor-
poration with ii shareholders may become eligible to file a Subchapter S
election if two of its shareholders get married and put all their stock into a
joint tenancy, but lose its eligibility if the stock is divided between them on
divorce.8" If a married couple prefers to hold their stock in separate ac-
counts, however, they may thereby bar a Subchapter S election. To this
extent, Subchapter S discriminates among married couples according to
the form of legal ownership they employ for their assets.
The personal holding company provisions, on the other hand, contain
constructive ownership rules that cause husband and wife to be treated
as a single shareholder, regardless of how they hold their assets."1 As a
79. Many other provisions also operate differently for married and single taxpayers. See, e.g.,
§ 217(b)(3), 28(b)(x), 1244(b), and I25r(a)(2)(C).
8o. See Hicks Nurseries, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 74-2434 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, x975).
81. See § 544(a) ().
For another way of dealing with ownership of property within the family, see § 1034(g), per-
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result, a corporation with enough shareholders to escape the personal hold-
ing company tax may become vulnerable if two shareholders get married
and regain its immunity if they are divorced. A similar fate can befall two
corporations each of which enjoys its own $25,ooo corporate surtax exemp-
tion and $iooooo accumulated earnings credit. If a shareholder of one mar-
ries a shareholder of the other, the two corporations may become "affiliated"
under sections 1561-1564, requiring them to share a single exemption and
credit, and divorce may terminate the corporate affiliation and restore the
status quo ante. In many situations, these consequences of marriage and
divorce are visited upon other shareholders, even if they are complete
strangers to the couple whose marital status is controlling.
To the extent they recognize legal ownership between spouses as a tax
factor, provisions of this type are inconsistent with the fundamental deci-
sion in 1948 to impose the same tax burden on all equal-income married
couples, regardless of the source or form of income. But Congress has not
been much concerned with tidying up the conceptual loose ends left by the
1948 revolution. Instead, legislative attention has been focused on the for-
gotten people of 1948: the nation's single persons.
II. RELATIvE TAx BuRDENs oF MARID COUPLES AND
OTHER TAxPAYEs
A. The Problem Emerges
The congressional committee reports recommending enactment of the
1948 joint return argued at length that all equal-income married couples
should pay the same amount of income taxes, but said nothing about the
relationship of that burden to the tax burden on other taxpayers.82 It is easy
to account for this silence. An unspoken premise of the i948 legislative de-
bate was that married couples in the community property states were not
to be subjected to a tax increase; the bruising political fight of 1941, ending
in the defeat of two proposals that would have produced such an increase,
was still fresh in mind. Given this constraint, Congress was led almost
irresistibly to extend the tax advantages of the community property system
to married taxpayers in other states. If these taxpayers were to be equalized
with community property couples, and the latter were not to be stripped
of their historic privilege of paying the same tax as two unmarried taxpayers
mitting husband and wife to elect to be treated as a unit in applying § 1034, so that gain realized on
the sale of a personal residence will not be recognized if a replacement residence is purchased within a
specified period of time, even though the first residence was owned by the husband and the second
was purchased by the wife, or vice versa. If the election is not made, however, the gain will qualify
for nonrecognition only if the same spouse owns both houses, or both are held in joint ownership.
82. But see Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 277
(1948) (testimony of Robert Foley).
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each with one-half their combined income, the relationship between the tax
liability of married couples and that of unmarried taxpayers was predeter-
mined; no discussion seemed necessary.
Once enacted, however, income splitting for married couples came to be
seen as a tax allowance for family responsibilities. So viewed, it was assailed
as unfair by taxpayers with similar family responsibilities, such as un-
married persons with dependent children or parents, who argued that their
taxpaying capacity was no greater than that of a married couple with the
same amount of income.83 To be sure, anyone supporting a dependent was
entitled to an exemption, but this allowance ($6oo per dependent, under
1948 law) was far less generous than the special rate schedule applicable
to married couples filing joint returns.
Acknowledging merit in this complaint, in 1951 Congress prescribed
a special head of household ("HOH") rate schedule for an unmarried
person maintaining his home as the principal place of abode for a depen-
dent or for a child (or other descendent) even if not a dependent.8 The
new schedule for HOH returns produced a tax liability for a given amount
that was midway between the liability of a single person and that of a
married couple filing a joint return.
Thus, the rate concession to heads of households was only half a loaf,
when compared with the tax advantage of the joint return. But the Code
does not require HOH taxpayers to amalgamate their income with the
income of their fellow householders, and this sometimes enables a two-
person household to pay less than a married couple with the same aggre-
gate income. But if the head of household is the only breadwinner, the
HOH tax liability is heavier than the tax on a married couple, even if their
income and family expenses are identical. 5
The 1951 reform was reexamined by Congress only 3 years after its
enactment. In 1954, the House proposed to extend the full benefit of
income splitting to any "head of family," a new concept that was broader
in some respects and narrower in others than the term "head of house-
hold" as defined by the 1951 legislation." The reasons for the proposal,
as explained by the House Committee on Ways and Means, were:
83. This problem had been anticipated by the 1947 Treasury study describing the split-income
proposal for married couples: "The split-income plan would produce differences in tax burden be-
tween the married couple and the head of family. . . . In view of these differences it may be neces-
sary to consider in conjunction with a split-income plan the case for granting certain heads of families
the tax equivalent of equal division of income in order to place them on a comparable basis with
married couples." Treasury Department, supra note i, at 858.
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § i2(c) (now INT. REv. CODE O 1954, § i(b)).
85. Under the 1974 rate schedules, for example, a married couple with $24,000 of taxable in-
come pays .95,66o in taxes, while a head of household with the same income pays S6,22o. But if the
latter's income is divided between the head of household ($S6,ooo) and a child ($8,ooo), their tax
liability would be S3,540 (HOH) plus $SI,59o (child), or a total of $5,130.
86. Cf. note 147 infra.
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Your committee believes that the present provision is unfair in that it denies
full income splitting to widows and widowers with small children who prior to
the death of their spouses had this tax advantage. Moreover, the fact that a de-
pendent may not be able, or willing, to live in the home of the taxpayer may
increase, rather than decrease the expenses of the taxpayer. On the other hand,
the present provision grants head of household status on account of children or
grandchildren whom the taxpayer does not actually support.
Under this bill a "head of family" is entitled to full income-splitting benefits.
This not only removes the hardship described above but also makes it possible
to do away with the separate rate schedule required by present law for heads of
households. Also, under the bill the dependent giving the taxpayer head of
family status no longer must live in his household. On the other hand, the tax-
payer will have to actually support the dependent giving him "head of family"
status, and the classes of dependents which may make the taxpayer eligible for
this status are limited to his son, daughter, father, mother, brother, or sister 87
The Senate Finance Committee recommended a rejection of the House
proposal, because it "did not treat all income groups equally and benefits
primarily the middle- and upper-income groups."8 " When the bill went
to conference, the dispute between the House and the Senate was com-
promised by expanding the existing HOH provisions to embrace a depen-
dent parent, even if that parent were living separately from the taxpayer,
and by according the full benefits of income splitting to a "surviving
spouse" (defined as a widow or widower whose home is the principal place
of abode for a dependent child) for two taxable years after the spouse's
death."
The HOH and surviving spouse provisions of 1951 and 1954 responded
to the complaint of unmarried taxpayers with dependents that their family
responsibilities were comparable to those of married couples. But the pro-
visions did not question-indeed, they implicitly ratified-the tax differ-
ential established in 1948 between a married couple and a single person
with the same income. By 1969, when Congress made a major change that
will be described shortly, the 1948 principle of imposing the same tax on
a married couple as on two single persons each of whom has one-half the
couple's income had come to produce the illustrative differences set out in
Table 3. Increasingly, these disparities became the subject of public atten-
tion.
87. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (z954).
88. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
89. See Pechman, Individual Income Tax Provisions of the 1954 Code, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 114, 128
(1955). There are a lot of fine, even finicky, distinctions in the head-of-household and surviving
spouse provisions, and judicial interpretations of such terms as "maintains," "household," and "prin-
cipal place of abode" have added more refinements. Given the diversity of family responsibilities and
living arrangements that characterize our society, any legal boundary in this area will inevitably sep-
arate cases whose differences are barely perceptible.
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TABLE 3
TAX LIABILITY OF SINGLE AND MARRIED TAXPAYERS (1970 RATES)
Taxable Single Married Couple
Income Person (Joint Return)




NoTE: Being based on taxable income, the table does not reflect the effect of deductions and personal
exemptions, which may vary among.the taxpayers being compared.90
B. The Insoluble Dilemmas
Some tax theorists have been unable to locate a justification for these
differentials. They see income splitting of the c948 variety as a "subsidy"
for getting married and, since the benefits rise with the couple's income,
as an "erosion"' of the progressive rate structure-even as a "loophole." 2
These pejorative labels imply that the separate rate schedule for married
couples is an unjustified departure from a generally accepted standard.
What, then, is the "proper" relationship between the tax rates on joint
and individual income?
In offering answers to this question, tax theorists have customarily
pointed to the following differences between the economic status of single
persons without family responsibilities and married couples with the same
amount of income, but without agreeing on the weight or even on the rele-
vance of all of these characteristics:
i. The income of a married couple must support two persons, not one.
2. As compared with two single persons, a married couple benefits from
economies of scale-a single kitchen will suffice, for example, and their
food can be purchased in larger quantities.
9o . Table 3 is based on Richards, Single Versus Married Income Tax Returns under the Tax Re-
form Act of z969, TAXEs 301, 302 (1970).
91. See Pechman & Okner, Individual Tax Erosion by Income Classes, in JoINT E oNo IC Comms.
92d Cong., 2d Sess., TaE EcoNo.sIcs oF FEDERAL SUSmY PRoGaMs 13, 20, 23 (Comm. Print 1972).
92. See, e.g., P. STERN, Tn RAPE OF Tra TAxPAYER, 12o (1973): "In most American homes, if
there is only one breadwinner, it is the husband. The weekly pay check is made out in his name.
Nevertheless, the tax laws permit the husband, in making out his tax return, to make believe that half
of the pay check has been earned by his spouse. This fiction comes to pass because of special tax rates
that may be used by couples filing a joint return.
This is an enormously expensive fiction: even most experts are astonished at its prodigious cost,
but according to the Brookings Institution computer analysis, this one feature of the tax law costs the
U.S. Treasury about twenty-one and a hall billion dollars every yearl" (emphasis in the original).
See ako Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Committee,
93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. II, 254 (973) (testimony of Joseph Pechman) (calling the provision a
"bonanza") [hereinafter cited as z973 JEC Hearings]. The advantage of income splitting is also
classified as a tax "erosion." See Pechman & Ochner, supra note 91, at 13, 20, 23.
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3- If only one spouse is employed, the married couple enjoys the un-
taxed housework performed by the other spouse.
This summary of differences compares single persons who live alone
and have no dependents with one-job married couples. As will be seen,
there is ample room for disagreement about the relative tax burdens that
should be borne by these two polar cases. But, alas, these are neither the
only, nor necessarily the most significant, actual living patterns of Ameri-
can taxpayers. Attention must also be given to single persons who support
children or other dependents, whether in their own homes or elsewhere,
unmarried persons who share the expenses of a single household, two-job
married couples, and taxpayers with still other arrangements. 3 Unfortu-
nately, when the debate is enriched by these complexities, the already
divergent pathways to reform dissolve into a skein of competing trails.
i. The burden on marital income.
Marriage affects the legal rights of each spouse to what would other-
wise be "his" or "her" unfettered income by creating an obligation of
support and restrictions on the right to transfer property during life and
at death. Since the receipt of $io,ooo of marital income does not carry
with it the same rights that are embodied in $io,ooo of "single" income,"
these two amounts should not necessarily be taxed as though they were
identical. Instead, it is often argued, marital income should be attributed,
and taxed, one-half to each spouse. The rationale is not only that the legal
incidents of marital income are divided between the two spouses, but also
that they both contribute to its realization. Community property law has
been subjected to much derision,"5 but in recent years at least, most of its
critics have embraced its basic principle of a "marital partnership" and have
complained only that it fails to practice what it preaches." Even in corn-
93. For a chart describing some of these other family and household patterns, see Table 6 infra.
94. I do not mean to suggest that the law of support is satisfactory today, or that the legal obli-
gations imposed in theory are readily enforced. See B. BAEcocK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NoarTo.x & S.
Ross, SEx DISCRIZAINATION AND THE LAW 619-3i (1975); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Mar-
riage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 558 (1974)-
Support laws are criticized, however, for failing adequately to assure the wife's claim to a share of
the husband's income. In framing a tax structure, it is appropriate to build on this claim, rather than
to denigrate it by suggesting that a spouse's legal and moral rights to his or her earnings are identical
to those of an unmarried person.
If both husband and wife receive income, the burdens on each one's income are counterbalanced
to some extent by benefits in the other's income, but the benefits and burdens will be equal only in
unusual circumstances (e.g., equal amounts of income with equal prospects for future indigency and
identical mortality expectations).
95. See, e.g., notes 40 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
96. See text note, "Position of the Wile in Common Law and Community Property States," in
K. DAvsmsoN, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEx-BASED DrscRtIMINATIoN 158-71 (1974), and articles cited
therein. See also Bingaman, The Community Property Act of r973: A Commentary and Quasi-
Legislative History, 5 N. Mx. L. REv. 1 (975), (describing amendments to New Mexico's commu-
nity property law to comply with the Equal Rights Amendment to its state constitution); Glendon,
Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 Tum. L. Rav. 21 (x974).
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mon law states, the concept of a marital partnership is a widespread ideal
and, whether realized in fact or not, it is an appealing principle to use in
fixing the tax liability of married couples.
A diametrically opposing school of thought points out that the legal,
emotional, and social burdens on marital income are self-imposed, since
they result from the voluntary decision of the parties to get married. These
tax theorists argue that a tax on income should take no more account of
a marriage vow than of the taxpayer's propensity to spend his or her in-
come on vacations, hobbies, or riotous living." In their view, the fact that
a married person has less legal, emotional, or social control over "his" or
"her" income than a single person is irrelevant. The loss of control to the
other spouse, it is asserted, merely reflects a personal decision to spend one's
income in a particular manner, in anticipation of greater satisfactions than
alternative uses of the funds."
The marriage-as-consumption objection to taxing marital income differ-
ently from an equal amount of "single" income is sometimes buttressed
by an appeal to the Haig-Simons definition of income.9 The force of this
appeal to authority is weakened, however, by the fact that Simons himself
wobbled when he discussed the issue-perhaps in implicit acknowledge-
ment that the definition seeks to determine whether a given item consti-
tutes income, but does not purport to decide who should be taxed on the
item in question if there are several candidates for this privilege. More-
over, in an area so entangled with social and psychological issues of a "non-
tax" character, it is absurd to think that an economist's definition can pro-
vide a uniquely "correct" solution. Lexicographers reflect public policy
more often than they make it.
In any event, though voluntary, marriage has social consequences that
are far more fundamental than ordinary consumption expenditures. This
conclusion does not necessarily lead irresistibly to 194 8-style income split-
ting, or indeed to any other tax allowance for married persons. What it does
suggest is that, there being a significant difference between the income of a
married person and the same amount of income accruing to a single per-
son, a distinction betwen marital and single income does not breach any
97. A similar objection is sometimes offered to tax allowances for children and other dependents.
See notes 147-79 infra and accompanying text.
9 8. See, e.g., Pechman, supra note i, at 479, (referring to "people who prefer to spend part of
their income on a wife rather than to spend it in other ways.") I do not know of many marriage-as-
consumption theorists, however, who are prepared to apply the theory rigorously and to oppose
all tax allowances for marriage. Pechman, for example, favors the use of personal exemptions rather
than the rate schedule to adjust tax burdens to family size.
99. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (i) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." H. SaboNs, P.aSoNA.L INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
See gcnerally A ComPaiHEsrIvE INcoaz TAx BAsE? (1968).
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rational principle of "neutrality." This in turn means that more heat than
light is generated by applying such labels as "subsidy," "tax erosion," and
"loophole" to legislative decisions taxing marital income differently from
"single" income.
Of course, the burdens on one's income that stem from marriage are
not unique. Parents have a legal obligation to support their minor children,
and children must support their parents under certain conditions. There
are also powerful social, psychological, and religious pressures to support
one's legal dependents on a more generous scale than the law requires and
to extend aid to other relatives who are outside the circle of legal compul-
sion. I have suggested elsewhere that what we choose to call the hus-
band's income is not solely "his" to the extent that he is required by law
to use it for the support of his wife or children and that he could properly
be regarded as a conduit pro tanto, this portion of his earnings being ex-
cluded from his return and taxed to the wife or child °0 Since law is only
one measure of the extent to which income is shared, it would not be fanci-
ful to apply the "conduit" theory beyond the level of legally enforceable
support by permitting income splitting on a fractional basis between the
wage earner and the members of his or her family. On the other hand,
the legal and social relationships between taxpayers and their children,
parents, and distant relatives might properly be distinguished by Congress
from the obligations of one spouse to another. Responsibility for the use
of the family income is ordinarily more equally divided between marital
partners than between them and other members of the nuclear or extended
family, and this difference can justify (though of course it does not com-
pel) a fuller tax recognition of marital obligations than other instances of
family support.
2. Economies of scale.
As compared with a single person having no dependents, a married
couple with the same amount of income must feed, clothe, and house two
persons rather than one. As compared, on the other hand, with two un-
married persons who live separately, a married couple enjoys economies
of scale in consumption. A single place of abode is cheaper than two sepa-
rate establishments, and the duplication of many other expenses, from
automobiles to newspaper subscriptions, can often be avoided. Reductions
oo. See B. BrrER, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 8o
Htmv. L. REv. 925 (1967), in A COMPREIMNSIVE INcomE TAx BAsE?, supra note 99, at i, 5r. The
same approach is developed in detail by Professor Wayne Barnett, who points out that allocating
income in this fashion is especially appropriate if the focus of tax policy is, as he argues it should be,
on the consumption rather than the source of income. See W. Barnett, [untitled], 1975 (unpublished
manuscript on file with Prof. W. Barnett at Stanford Law School). See also supra note x, at 848,
862-63 (discussing a per capita division of fanifly income); note x68 infra.
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in the cost of still other items, such as food, are also typical, even though
the expense may not be cut in half.
These observations often lead to the conclusion that a married couple
with, say, $2oooo of income should pay less tax than a single person with
$2o,0oo of income, but more than two single persons with $io,ooo of in-
come each. This conclusion is closely linked with the rationale, discussed
above, for taxing marital income more leniently than the same amount of
"single" income, since the married couple's economies of scale can be
treated as an offset to the fact that their income must support two persons
rather than one. But the same type of calculation might be employed in
fixing the tax liability of certain other taxpayers. In the case of a widow
with a dependent child or a taxpayer with a dependent parent, for ex-
ample, a single income has to provide for two persons, but the cost of
supporting the dependent is less if they live in one household rather than
two. The phenomenon is not confined to two-person groups; it is often
suggested or assumed that tax allowances for married couples or other
persons with two or more dependents should take account of the extra
mouths that must be fed, discounted to reflect the economies of scale avail-
able because the group actually, or presumptively, occupies only one place
of abode.
It is far from clear, however, that economies of scale should be taken
into account. For one thing, no tax law could consistently do so. Unmar-
ried persons often share the expenses of a single household and members
of a commune who buy their soy beans by the bushel save even more
money, but it would be intolerably abrasive to gear their tax liability to
their living arrangements, taxing unrelated persons who live together
more heavily than those who prefer solitude.
The practical barrier to taking the economies of scale enjoyed by these
unmarried groups into account however, does not necessarily mean that
comparable savings should be ignored in the case of married couples and
other family groups. Unrelated persons who share expenses do not get any
tax allowance; by contrast, if the taxpaying capacity of married couples
is to be fixed by reference to their cost of living, the relevant standard is
the average cost of mantaining a single household, rather than two sepa-
rate establishments. But it is also arguable that marital income should be
taxed as though realized one-half by each spouse, with each paying the
same tax as a single person with that amount of income. This was the prac-
tical outcome of the joint return from 1948 to 1971; the married couple's
economies of scale were disregarded, but so were any economies of scale
that might have been enjoyed by the two single persons to whom they were
analogized.
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Assuming, however, that the married couple's economies of scale (as
compared with a single person who lives alone on the same income)
affect their taxpaying capacity and should be taken into account in fixing
their tax liability, how should the amount of their cost of living advan-
tage be ascertained?
In answering this question, tax theorists usually turn for guidance to
government cost-of-living indexes for households of various sizes."' If these
estimates demonstrate that a one-person household can maintain the same
standard of living as a two-person household for 75 percent of the latter's
cost, for example, it is customarily argued that the taxpaying capacities
of the two units bear the same relationship and that their tax liabilities
should be fixed accordingly °0 On these assumptions, a single person with
$3,ooo of income should pay the same tax as a married couple with $4,ooo
of income, a single person with $6,ooo of income should pay the same tax
as a married couple with $8,ooo of income, and so on.
The weakest part of this theory is concealed in the phrase "and so on."
The theory may be persuasive (or, at least, the best we have) for taxpayers
at low income levels, but its application to taxpayers further up the income
ladder depends on the continued validity of the cost-of-living indexes. But
the fact that a single taxpayer could survive on $3,oo a year while a mar-
ried couple would need $4,000 for a similar survival kit is a flimsy reed
for concluding that a single taxpayer with $75,ooo of income can live as
well, and hence has about the same taxpaying capacity, as a married couple
with $ioo,ooo of income.
The cost of living indexes with which we are familiar, however, focus
almost exclusively on taxpayers at lower or very modest income levels °0
But the search for a rich man's cost-of-living index as a guide to the rela-
tive taxpaying capacity of high-income households of various sizes encoun-
ters hopeless ambiguities. If this were only a matter of a different "market
basket"-squab, artichokes, and scotch rather than hamburger, potatoes,
and beer-the Labor Department could recompute its estimates with tol-
erable accuracy. The real problem is that the very concept of a comparable
"cost of living" evaporates when the analyst turns from near-subsistence
taxpayers to wealthy ones.
Iol. See, e.g., B. BiTXER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GirT TAxATIox 356
(4 th ed. 1972); BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REVISED EQurVALENcE SCA 2LES
FOR ESTIMATING EQUIVALENT INCOMES OR BUDGET COSTS BY FAisy TTPE, 4 (1968); Brackett, Urban
Family Budgets Updated to Autumn x973, 97 MONTnLY LABOR REv., Aug. 1974, at 57-58, Table 2.
For a systematic application of these welfare-ratios to taxpayers at different income levels, see
Bridges, Family Need Differences and Family Tax Burden Estimates, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 423 (1971).
io2. See B. BrrrY.ER & L. STONE, supra note IoX, at 356.
103. The Labor Department describes its budget as being "adequate" for family living. See, e.g.,
BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, note iox supra at iii. Some efforts have been made to project a cost-
of-living index for families having a "higher budget" ($i8,ooo for a family of four). See, e.g.,
Brackett, note sos supra.
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If well-to-do married couples entertain more lavishly than their unmar-
ried friends of equal means, should the differential be taken into account
in fixing their respective tax liabilities? If rich unmarried taxpayers are
more likely to buy their meals in expensive restaurants than to dine at
home, or if they frequent night clubs while their married friends are con-
tent with a TV set, should this be counted as a burden, or as an advantage,
of their single status? If married couples feel the need to save part of their
income to protect the survivor if the breadwinner dies first, and unmarried
taxpayers are less concerned about the future, is the cost of living pro tanto
greater for married couples ?0"
These uncertainties in the very meaning of the term "cost of living"
strike me as so fundamental as to make it impossible to establish com-
parable personal budgets for unmarried and married high-income taxpay-
ers, in order to compute family-size ratios similar to those computed for
low-income taxpayers. But even if the obstacles are circumvented and it
turns out, for example, that an unmarried taxpayer with $6o,ooo of income
can live on the same scale-theater tickets, European vacation, Manhattan
apartment, ski lodge, custom-tailored clothing, etc.--as a married couple
with $ioo,ooo, would this suggest that their tax liabilities should be the
same? Perhaps both taxpaying units would incur the same sacrifice if their
consumption were reduced, but this is not self-evident, and we have no
better guide than intuition in making this judgment. Once this is recog-
nized, a more basic doubt arises. Perhaps the initial hypothesis that the
tax liabilities of households of different sizes should be related to their
respective costs of living is valid only for taxpayers at or near the sub-
sistence level and breaks down when the major items in the "cost of
living" are luxuries."'
3. The value of unpaid household services.
In comparing the taxpaying capacities of married couples and single
persons, tax theorists often point out that marriage usually brings about a
104. The Treasury Study refers to the fact that "the proportion of income used for consumption
purposes tends to decrease and savings tend to increase as income increases" and assumes that a felt
need to accumulate savings, even for the retirement or the support of children, is not part of the cost
of living. See Treasury Department, supra note x, at 846. But a contrary view is at least equally reason-
able, though it would be difficult if not impossible to measure the amount of savings that taxpayers
at any given income level customarily regard as part of their cost of living.
105. To be sure, cost-of-living indexes always embody prevailing social and cultural assump-
tions; if exported to the Indian subcontinent, the Social Security Administration's "poverty line"
would be a measure of comparative affluence. But confined to the United States, it designates a cate-
gory of persons who, by general agreement, have little or no "taxpaying capacity." This suggests
that it is also a useful measure of the comparative taxpaying capacities of persons who are only
slightly above this bottom category. Groves describes a Swedish system that provides substantially the
same differentiation between married couples and single persons at low income levels as the 1948-
71 United States system but reduces and ultimately eliminates the differential as income rises. See H.
Gnovs, supra note x, at 104.
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change in the ratio of money to non-money income, the latter consisting
of the material benefits that flow from do-it-yourself work at home. If only
one spouse is employed outside the home, these benefits-not taxable un-
der current law-can obviously be of great economic value,'" but even if
both spouses are employed, they may derive more untaxed income from
household activity because they can cooperate-one can hold the ladder
while the other is painting the ceiling, etc.-than two unattached indi-
viduals who live alone.
Since there is no likelihood that Congress will change the law by
requiring unpaid household services to be valued and included in taxable
income, any attempt to relate the tax rate on a married couple's money
income to the value of unpaid services is bound to generate inequalities.
If their tax, as compared with the liability of a single person, is based on
the assumption that one spouse typically stays at home and augments their
money income by performing household services, the tax bill of two-job
couples will be unjustifiably high. If separate rate schedules are prescribed
for one-job and two-job couples, the result will be an indirect tax on the
non-money income of one-job married couples, without a corresponding
tax on the non-money income of single persons who are able to perform
substantial domestic services because they live on income from invest-
ments'07
Assertions that the tax advantage of income splitting under current law
is a "loophole" seem based, at least in part, on a concept of taxpaying
capacity that takes into account the imputed income of one-job married
couples but not the imputed income of other persons. Perhaps income
splitting fails to eliminate the advantage derived by this large and impor-
tant group of taxpayers from the fact that the value of household services
is not taxed. (I say "perhaps" because there is no theoretically "correct"
tax rate on married couples and hence there is no way to prove that the
value of the stay-at-home spouse's household services is-or is not-already
reflected by the tax rates applicable to married couples.) If there is a cul-
prit, however, it is not income splitting, but the failure to tax imputed
income.
4. Closing the "gap."
In the end, therefore, the tax rate differential between single and mar-
ried persons rests-and must rest-on judgments as subjective and politi-
io6. See B. BAcocx ET AL.., supra note 94, at 663-72.
107. But the distinction might be supported on the theory that the imputed income of married
couples is taken into account only to measure more accurately the additional cost of supporting the
second person in the household. This rationale would imply that imputed income should also be taken
into account in fixing the level of dependency deductions and other tax allowances for family size.
See note 157 infra.
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TABLE 4
ADjUSTED GRoss INCOmE REPORTE ON 1971 TAXABLE RETURNS
(Dollar Amounts in Billions)
Separate
Husband Head of
All Joint and Wife Household Single
Returns Returns* Returns Returns Returns
All returns $674.4 $525 $10 $24 $111
AGI of $10,000 to $25,000 341 307 3 6 25
AGI of $25,000 and over 110 102 0.6 1.4 6
0 Includes surviving spouse returns.
SouRcE: U.S. DEP'T OF TREAsuRy, STATIsTics OF INCOm-1971 INlvsMuAL INcoMMn TAx RETUmRs
8-10, 13, 15, Tables 1-2 (1972).
cal as those that determine the degree of progression in the rate schedule
itself. Moreover, even if general agreement were reached that the differ-
ential between tax rates on individual and joint income is too large at pres-
ent, the best remedy would not necessarily be-as is sometimes assumed-
a rise in the liability of married couples. After all, a gap may be narrowed
from either end.
Repealing income splitting would, of course, greatly increase both the
income tax's yield and its rate of progression. But this fact does not imply
that income splitting is a loophole. If increases in yield and progression
are thought desirable, they can and should be promoted on their merits.
Such changes can be accomplished through suitably graduated rate in-
creases on both individuals and married couples; there is no need to elimi-
nate whatever rate differential between these groups is thought to be appro-
priate. Conversely, the differential itself can be narrowed or widened with-
out significantly changing the tax's aggregate yield or rate of progression.
In deciding how to close the tax gap between married and single tax-
payers, should that seem desirable, one should note that joint returns now
report the overwhelming bulk of all income subject to tax. In 1971, for
example, the $674 billion of adjusted gross income reported on taxable
returns was divided as shown in Table 4.
Converted into percentages, these statistics disclose that about 78 percent
of all adjusted gross income is reported by married couples on joint returns,
while only about i6 percent is reported by single persons who are not heads
of households. Even more significant are the percentages for taxpayers with
adjusted gross income of $ioooo or more, where the impact of income
splitting is most important. At these levels, 9o percent of adjusted gross in-
come is reported by married couples, and only about 7 percent by single
persons.
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Thus, income splitting covers so much income that it is for practical
purposes an intrinsic part of the rate schedule. If the differential accorded
to married couples is too great, the simplest and most plausible remedy is
to reduce the tax rates on individual income, not to increase the rates on
joint income."0 8 The former solution not only would disturb the status quo
for fewer people, but also would have a lesser effect on total tax revenues,
a virtue when the object of a tax change is technical reform rather than a
shift in macroeconomic policy.
C. Recent Developments
i. Mitigation of the "penalty" for being unmarried.
Without explicitly saying so, Congress came close to accepting this anal-
ysis in 1969. Concluding that income splitting in its pre-1969 form created
too great a disparity between married couples and other taxpayers, Con-
gress chose not to repeal income splitting but to extend part of its benefits
to unmarried taxpayers. In effect, income splitting was viewed as part of
the rate structure, as it had been in 195i when the HOH rates were pre-
scribed. Indeed, the House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 simply
expanded the i951 allowance by allowing widows, widowers, and single
persons over the age of 35 to file HOH returns, even if they had no de-
pendents. On the Treasury's recommendation, however, the Senate substi-
tuted and Congress enacted a more inclusive but less generous remedy,
consisting of a new rate schedule for unmarried taxpayers, regardless of
age, under which their liability would not exceed a married couple's tax
by more than 20 percent at any taxable income level. The Senate Finance
Committee justified its rejection of the House proposal as follows:
The committee agrees with the House that the tax differential between single
and married taxpayers is excessive but does not believe that the differential should
be reduced only for single persons age 35 and over (and widows and widowers)
as provided in the House bill. This age 35 test seems arbitrary and unrelated to
the basic issue of whether there is too great a tax difference between single and
married taxpayers resulting from marital status. In addition, there is good reason
for maintaining a tax differential between single persons and heads-of-households
who in fact maintain a household for a dependent. This distinction would, of
course, be eliminated under the House bill. In view of these considerations, the
committee substituted for the House provision the rate schedule which limits the
tax paid by all single persons regardless of age to no more than i2o percent of
the tax paid by married taxpayers at the same taxable income level. 1 9
io8. The much-cited "revenue loss" of $21.5 billion from income splitting, see Stern, stupra
note 92, comes from Pechrnan & Okner, supra note 9i. The figure represents the additional revenue
that would be raised if the rate schedule of § i(d) (married persons filing separate returns) were
applied to all taxpayers, regardless of marital status. In fact, this schedule is used by only a comparative
handful of taxpayers (see Table 4) and hence can hardly be regarded as the "standard" schedule.
1o9. S. RtP. No. 91-552, 9i st Cong., ist Sess. 262 (g6g), reprinted in 1969-3 Ctmr. BuLL. 433,
589.
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For taxable incomes between $14,000 and $iooooo, a range that em-
braces 17 percent of all taxable returns, a single person's liability is now
from 17 to 20 percent above that of a married couple with the same tax-
able income."' For taxpayers above and below these brackets, the post-
1969 disparity between single and married persons is smaller, because the
tax effect of joint return income splitting is less pronounced at very low
and very high income levels."'
The 1969 improvement in the position of single taxpayers was accom-
panied by a change in the tax treatment of married persons who elect to
file separate returns. This practice was permissible before 1969, but it almost
always generated a higher tax liability than a joint return, and hence was
employed in cases of marital estrangement (e.g., if the more prosperous
spouse wanted to avoid disclosure of his or her income to the other, or if
the latter refused to sign a joint return".). When the single-person rates
were reduced in 1969, however, separate returns would have become pref-
erable to joint returns for many married taxpayers with relatively equal
amounts of income, such as couples with two jobs or a community prop-
erty residence. Recognizing that the use of separate returns by such per-
sons would revive the pre-1948 geographical disparity between community
property and common law states, as well as the opportunity to reduce taxes
by intraspousal gifts of income-producing property, Congress rounded out
the 1969 reform by denying use of the new single person rate schedule to
married taxpayers filing separate returns. For this limited group of tax-
payers, the pre-1969 single person rate schedule was preserved. Thus, sepa-
rate returns are not more advantageous to married couples now than they
were from 1948 to 1969.
2. The "marriage penalty."
Because married persons who file separate returns must use a special
rate schedule rather than the one applicable to unmarried persons, the 1969
reform imposes a "marriage penalty" on persons with relatively equal
amounts of income who get married and continue to have the same
amount of income thereafter."' If John and Martha have taxable income
of $16,ooo each, for example, the pre-marriage tax is $3,830 each, or a
xo. See S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note io9, at 260. Before the 1969 reform, the differential
against single persons in these brackets ranged from 22% at $IOO,OOO to 29% at $X4,000 with a
peak differential of 41% at q26,ooo. See id. at 261, Table 21.
The x969 concession to single taxpayers was accompanied by a reduction of the rates applicable
to HOH returns to preserve their historic midway position between the joint return and single tax-
payer rates.
x2. See id.
x x2. For other instances where separate returns may have been advantageous, see note 73 supra.
113. "Marriage penalties" were not unknown under pre-1969 law. The attribution rules, see
notes 187-93 infra and accompanying text, for example, could and still can impose on unwary tax-
payers penalties much in excess of the 2969 marriage penalty; indeed, the penalty is limited only by
the size of the taxpayer's closely held corporation or other financial entity whose transactions bring
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total of $7,66o. If they get married and file a joint return, however, their
liability will rise by $i,ooo, to $8,66o. They are entitled to file separate
returns if they wish, but that will not restore the status quo ante, since
they are no longer eligible for the single-person rates that were formerly
applicable to them. Instead, they must use the special rate schedule for
married persons filing separate returns, which will impose a tax of $4,330
each, for a total of $8,66o-the same amount as a joint return.1
The "marriage penalty" is most severe for middle- and upper-income
taxpayers, reaching a maximum of $4,48o when each spouse has $35,o0o
of income. At any level, the penalty is most pronounced if the couple's
aggregate income is equally divided between them, but it is not inconsid-
erable even if the division is 6o-4o or 7o-3o"
Viewed in isolation, the penalty seems capricious and indefensible. But
it is the unavoidable result of pursuing two policies, both of which have
vigorous advocates, viz., (i) equal taxes for all equal-income married
couples; and (2) a smaller differential between single and married per-
sons than was provided by "pure" income splitting from 1948 to 1969. As
explained earlier, if the allocation of income between two married persons
is disregarded in order to impose the same tax on all married couples with
the same aggregate income, marriage will inevitably either raise or lower
the tax liability of all persons who get married, or raise it for some while
lowering it for others. The operation of this ironclad rule is illustrated
by Tables i and 2. Since Alpha and Beta paid a total tax of $2,00o before
marriage, they will be subject to a marriage penalty if the tax on $20,000
of joint income is more than $2,oo. But if the marriage penalty on Alpha-
Beta is eliminated by imposing a tax of $2,ooo or less on $2o,ooo of joint
income, Theta and Zeta will be "penalized" for remaining single. Another
way to describe this collision of objectives is that the tax paid by a married
couple must be (a) greater than they paid before marriage, in which event
they are subject to a marriage penalty, (b) less than they paid before mar-
riage, in which event unmarried persons are subject to a singles penalty,
the attribution rules into play. The Treasury's 1941 proposal for mandatory joint returns was also
attacked as imposing a marriage penalty, see note 56 supra.
For other pre-1969 marriage penalties, see Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study
of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 2x BuFF. L. Rav. 49, 50-58 (1971).
For a foreign parallel to the post-1969 marriage penalty in United States law, see N.Y. Times,
Apr. 27, 1975, at 9, col. I.
114. The results described in the text are based on hypothetical amounts of taxable income, and
therefore do not reflect another adverse affect on married couples of filing separate returns, viz.,
reduction in the standard deduction by virtue of the parenthetical restrictions in § x41(b) and x41(c).
Before marriage, John and Martha would each have been entitled to a standard deduction of $2,ooo in
computing their taxable income; after marriage, they are limited to $2,000 on a joint return and to
$i,ooo each if they file separate returns. (As a result of 1975 changes in § 141, applicable to 1975
only, John and Martha would be entitled to a standard deduction of $2,300 each if unmarried, but to
a deduction of $2,6oo if they are married and file a joint return).
115. For computations see 1972 House Hearings, supra note to, at 8o-83 (testimony of Hon.
Edwin S. Cohen).
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or (c) unchanged by marriage, in which event equal-income married
couples are subject to unequal taxes.
From 1948 to 1969, the tax differential between single and married tax-
payers imposed a "penalty" on being single."' In 1969, the penalty was re-
duced for some single taxpayers and eliminated for others, but this reform
had a price-either a penalty on some married couples or abandonment of
the 1948 principle of imposing equal taxes on equal-income couples. Given
this choice, Congress preferred the marriage penalty.
D. The Two-Job Married Couple
i. The problem.
In recent years, the two-job married couple" has moved to the center
of the stage in the ever changing but never ending drama entitled "Vic-
tims of Tax Injustice." They are penalized, it is argued, by two aspects of
the Internal Revenue Code. First, if they file a joint return, the second
salary is added to the first in computing their combined taxable income,
with the result that the first dollar of the second salary is taxed at the mar-
ginal rate applicable to the last dollar of the first salary."' In form, this
result can be avoided by filing separate returns, but the couple must then
use a special rate schedule that, as just explained, is deliberately designed
to prevent separate returns from reducing their aggregate tax burden."'
Second, on leaving home to take a job, the second spouse usually incurs
expenses-for transportation, more formal clothing, lunches, etc.-that can-
not be deducted under today's tax law.' Yet the entire salary must be
included in gross income. This results in a disparity between the couple's
statutory income and their economic gain, which is then widened by the
working spouse's inability to give as much time as formerly to maintain-
ing the home, preparing meals, and shopping for bargains, so that the
116. The penalty on single persons was held constitutional in Kellems v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
556 (1972), af'd per cUriam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (I973).
117. I use the term "job" to refer to work outside the home, not to imply that work within the
home is either easy or unproductive. This use of the term seems clear from the context, but sensitivities
in this area are so great that one must tread warily. See generally z973 JEC Hearings, supra note
92, at 228 (testimony of Grace Blumberg); id. at 234 (testimony of Carolyn McCaffery); Blumberg,
supra note 113, at 49; Nussbaum, The Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working Wives, 25
NAT'L TAX J. x83 (1972); Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present Income
Tax Laws, 49 TAxES 526 (1971); White, The Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working
Wives: A Comment, 26 NAT'L TAx J. i19 (1973).
118. This produces the marriage penalty that was just described. But the two-job couple's com-
plaint focuses on the marriage penalty imposed on earned income, often ignoring the fact that invest-
ment income is equally subject to a penalty if realized by the spouse who is not the breadwinner.
xi9. See notes X13-15 supra and accompanying text.
12o. See Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for
Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CoRNE.L L. Rav. 871 (1969). Klein's analysis
focuses on commuting expenses but could be extended to embrace other expenses on the personal-
business boundary. See also Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform
Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (974).
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couple may have to hire a domestic servant, eat more frequently in restau-
rants, and pay more for goods and services. If they have young children,
their economic gain from the second job will be eroded still further by
the cost of caring for the children at home or in a day care center. Of these
economic burdens, which are not borne by one-job married couples, the
Internal Revenue Code permits only child-care expenses to be deducted,
and this allowance is often less than the amount actually expended and
is denied entirely if the couple's adjusted gross income exceeds $44,6oo.
In combination, these features of existing law mean that the two-job
couple is taxed on the gross amount of the secondary salary even though
their economic gain is less than that amount, and at a higher rate than is
paid by a single person receiving the same salary.'22 Assume, for example,
that a married woman is offered a job paying $io,ooo a year, which will
increase the couple's taxable income from $14,000 (attributable to the hus-
band's earnings) to $24,000. Under 1975 rates, their taxes will rise by
$2,9oo. If we assume that the wife's transportation to work, lunches, and
clothing, part-time domestic service, occasional restaurant meals, and re-
duced opportunities to shop for bargains increase the couple's living ex-
penses by $3,5oo, the wife's $io,ooo job will produce only $3,6oo of after-
tax economic gain. At higher income levels, where the couple's accustomed
way of life is even more expensive to maintain and the applicable margi-
nal tax rate is higher, the second salary may be even more severely eroded.
A plausible example offered by a critic of existing law involves a married
woman whose $io,ooo salary yields a net of only $I,6fioo
12. See § 214. By virtue of a 1975 amendment the phase-out begins at $35,000 and wipes out
the deduction entirely at $44,600; the corresponding figures under the pre-1975 law were Si8,ooo
and $27,600.
Compare Feld, Deductibility of Expenses of Child Care and Household Services: New Sec-
tion 214, 27 TAX L. Rav. 415 (1972) and Feld, Another Word on Child Care, 28 TAx L. REv. 546
(973), with Schaffer & Berman, Two Cheers for the Child Care Deduction, 28 TAX L. REv. 535
(2973) and Schaffer & Berman, The Child Care Deduction and the Progressivity of the Income Tax,
A Reply to Professor Feld, 28 TAX L. REv. 549 (2973). See also Blumberg, supra note 113; Hjorth, A
Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Sec. 21o of the Revenue Act of 1971, 50 TAXES 233 (2972); Klein, Tax
Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rev. 927 (2973).
122. For calculations of the rate differential see Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 286-89; 1972
House Hearings, supra note 2o, at 8i (testimony of Hon. Edwin Cohen).
123. See 1973 fEC Hearings, supra note 92, at 229 (testimony of Grace Blumberg), setting out
this hypothetical case: Mrs. X is married to a young executive making $i5,ooo per year. She is
offered two jobs: an industrial job that promises long hours and pays $15,oo; and a college teaching
job with flexible hours and a salary of $2o,ooo. Since Mrs. X feels that she must bear primary respon-
sibility for the home duties, she considers only the teaching job. She calculates that it would cost
$2,400 per year for day care for her child, $x,ooo a year for a suitable wardrobe, $500 a year for
lunch, $6oo for commuting, and $5oo for miscellaneous expenses (e.g., larger reliance on convenience
foods).
Mrs. X finds that family expenses will increase $5,ooo if she returns to work. Her income will
be taxed at her husband's marginal rate. His taxable income is $8,ooo so her first dollar will be taxed
at 22%. Her employment will therefore increase the family's federal income tax bill from $2,380
to $3,820 (2972 rates); her share of the bill is $2,440. If State and local taxes average 5%, her cost
is $500. Social security taxes amount to another $486 (r972 rates). Mrs. X's gross income will yield
a net of $2,592.
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These burdens on the two-job married couple are often castigated as
a deterrent to the employment of married women outside the home. In
theory, of course, the burden arises whether the "secondary" wage-earner
is the husband or the wife, and hence falls on the couple jointly. In a soci-
ety that takes the husband's job for granted and views the wife as the sec-
ondary wage earner, however, it is reasonable to describe the existing state
of affairs as biased against women.
With these illustrations of the impact of existing law before us, it should
occasion no surprise that a plethora of solutions have been proposed for
the situation of the two-job couple. This is not the place to analyze their
details. I propose rather to examine the premises of the most commonly
mentioned remedies.24 and to show how-as so often in this complex area
-there are offsetting costs to every solution.
2. An earned income allowance?
One group of solutions for the plight of the two-job married couple
seeks to narrow or eliminate the gap between the dollar amount of the
second salary and the before-tax net economic gain it produces. The most
sweeping version of this approach would be a deduction for all expenses
attributable to the fact that both spouses, rather than only one, are work-
ing--not merely such job-related expenses as transportation and lunches,
but also expenses resulting from the secondary wage earner's loss of time
and energy for household services.
But how could such an allowance be verbalized or administered? Every
two-job married couple would be tempted to assert that but for the wife's
job, she would have done all of the housework, made the family's clothes,
cultivated a home garden, consulted Consumers' Reports every day, and
bought whatever the family needed at end-of-season clearance sales, and
that the cost of the goods and services required to replace these activities
qualifies for the proposed deduction.' There may be people who live,
rather than merely fantasize, the life reflected by the Whole Earth Cata-
logue. Faced by a married couple's assertion that "But for our two jobs,
124. Finding that wives are less likely to work outside the home than husbands, Michael
Boskin argues that a lower tax rate on the earnings of working wives would induce a more efficient
use of social resources. See M. Bosrun, OPTIaMA. Tax TREATMENT OF TIE FAMILY, Stanford University
Research Center in Economic Growth, Research Memoranda No. 143 (i973). Boskin's intriguing
proposal for rate schedules differentiated by reference to the elasticity of the supply of particular types
of labor would be applicable to other secondary wage earners (e.g., children living with their parents).
Because of these additional ramifications, as well as its dependence on the validity of labor market
statistics, the idea needs much more analysis before being placed on an active legislative agenda.
125. Indeed, a similar allowance could be claimed with about equal plausibility for the working
wife's loss of leisure, even if she frankly admits that but for her job, she would have engaged in social
or aesthetic, rather than money-saving, activities. The loss of time is real, whether it would have
been used to save money or to attain other objectives, but measuring the loss in dollars is easier if one
hypothesizes a money-oriented use of the lost time.
NuY 1975] 1433
HeinOnline -- 27 Stan L. Rev. 1433 1974-1975
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
that would be our lifestyle," should a conscientious revenue agent accept
the return as filed, administer a dose of truth serum, or give the secondary
wage earner a battery of vocational and psychological tests to determine
whether the couple could be self-sufficient if they were not holding two
jobs?
An inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service into the way married
couples would have lived if one spouse had remained at home would be
an intolerable intrusion into their personal life if relentlessly pursued. But
passive acceptance of self-serving declarations would invite shameless ex-
aggeration. Administration of the child-care deduction of Section 214 con-
tains the seeds of trouble, which grow with every relaxation of its statutory
restrictions. Possibly because of this threat to privacy, the Internal Reve-
nue Service has never seriously endeavored to determine whether a tax-
payer hired a babysitter in order to work, worked in order to hire a baby-
sitter, or would have hired a babysitter anyway, even though expenses are
deductible under Section 214 "only if . . incurred to enable the taxpayer
to be gainfully employed."' 28
Furthermore, any allowance based on actual increases in the taxpayer's
cost of living attributable to employment would overlook the fact that the
additional expenses, even if not wholly voluntary, ordinarily generate some
"personal" benefits. The two-job couple may be forced to eat in restaurants
more frequently than they otherwise would, but it is possible that they enjoy
this way of life; similarly, relief from housework is afforded by a two-job
couple's employment of a domestic servant. This dual aspect of expenses
on the personal-business borderline is, in general, disregarded for travel,
meals, and entertainment in the pursuit of business; such expenses can be
deducted in full even if the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from these
business-related activities 7 But this feature of existing law is open to
abuse, is often criticized, and is, at best, hardly a virtue to be emulated.
For these reasons, an open-ended earned-income allowance for all ex-
penses resulting from the secondary wage earner's employment is not
likely to gain acceptance. A more plausible proposal is a deduction or
credit of an arbitrary amount (related to the earnings of the spouse with
the lower salary), based on a presumption that the couple would have
lived more modestly if the second spouse had not been employed outside
the home. The allowance would be given without regard to whether the
126. The Treasury Regulations suggest that the necessary nexus between employment and child-
care expenses may be absent if the wife's earnings are less than the expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.214-
I(f (4) (197). But this seems to be the only hint of an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to
determine whether the domestic servant would have been employed even if the wife did not work
outside the home.
127. See generally §§ i62(a), 212, 274; B. BrrxaRE & L. SToNE, supra note xoi, at 233-76;
Klein, supra note 52O, at 878.
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presumption is in fact true in the individual case. Pechman, for example,
has suggested either a deduction (not to exceed $2,500) of 25 percent of
the second salary or a credit (not to exceed $i,ooo) of io percent of the
second salary." 8 Many variations on these proposals are obviously possible.
Whatever the details, however, the concept of an earned-income credit
solely for two-job married couples is curiously narrow. Everyone who
works away from home-not just the working wife-must get to the job
site, dress as the job requires, and pay for lunch if it is inconvenient to
bring it in a brown bag. Similarly, everyone who works has less time and
energy to keep house, prepare meals, and look for bargains. Employment
increases the cost of living for unmarried persons who live alone, as well
as for two-job married couples; even for the one-job married couple,
the primary earner's salary is burdened by these costs, so that they are at
a disadvantage as compared with married couples who live entirely on
investment income or pensions. In short, employment, not marital status,
produces the disparity between statutory income and economic gain that
constitutes one count in the two-job couple's indictment of existing law.
This analysis suggests that if a tax allowance for these expenses is war-
ranted (either to measure the employee's "income" more accurately or to
eliminate a disincentive to employment), it should embrace all employed
taxpayers, not merely two-job married couples. Indeed, this reasoning was
accepted during the years when an earned-income deduction was au-
thorized by Congress (i924-i93i and 1934-1943); all taxpayers receiving
earned income were eligible, regardless of their marital status.59
Because nearly 90 percent of all adjusted gross income reported on
federal tax returns consists of salaries, wages and self-employment in-
come; 3 however, an earned-income allowance would be enjoyed by vir-
tually all taxpayers. If the cost of the allowance were to be recouped by
increasing taxes on investment income, its enactment would serve the in-
tended function of reducing a tax barrier to employment, but if the lost
revenue were to be recouped by a general increase in rates-a more likely
outcome, one suspects-the government would be robbing Peter to pay
Peter.
This self-defeating aspect of a universal earned-income allowance would
not arise in an allowance restricted to two-job married couples, since
128. 1973 JEC Hearings, supra note 92, at 254 (testimony of Joseph Pechman). For the tem-
porary earned income credit enacted in 1975, see note 129 infra.
xzg. See 3 R. PAuL & J. MERTENS, LAw oF FEDMAL INCoME TAXATION § 30.i6-.2i (2934).
In 1975, just as this Article was going to press, Congress enacted § 43, providing an earned-in-
come credit of zo% of earned income for taxpayers with households that include a dependent child.
The credit is granted only to taxpayers with adjusted gross income of under $8,ooo (but will be paid
in cash if it exceeds the taxpayer's actual tax liability), is subject to a ceiling of $5oo, and is to be
effective for only one year.
i3o. U.S. DEP'T OF TREAsmuy, 1971 STATIsTICs OF INCOME § I, chart IA & table iA (1972).
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it would probably be financed by taxing a much larger circle of taxpayers.
Such a restricted allowance might be defended on the ground that, at least
for many families in moderate circumstances, only one spouse is compelled
by economic pressure to work outside the home, the second spouse-usu-
ally, in our society, the wife-being free to choose between unpaid house-
work and remunerative employment. Having this choice, she will be de-
terred-so the argument proceeds-from seeking a job outside the home,
regardless of her talents and inclinations, unless the tax laws are changed
to provide an earned-income allowance.
Advocates of a restricted earned-income allowance are not opposed in
theory to an extension of the allowance to other employees. They contend
rather that the working wife's plight is exceptionally deserving of a rem-
edy, and that a generous allowance for the two-job couple would be pref-
erable to a less generous allowance spread among all employees. Is it not
better for the Ford Foundation to give a lot of money to a few institu-
tions than to buy a glass of beer for everybody in the world?
It may well be that the disparity between the employee's gross salary
and the cash left after defraying employment-generated expenses is more
discouraging to wives than to other taxpayers, though this disincentive is
obviously outweighed by economic pressure or personal inclination for the
millions of wives who are already employed outside the homeY3' What is
far less clear is the extent of the deterrence. At most, a tax allowance would
be a partial offset to the employment-generated expenses that may be de-
terring these wives from joining the labor force; it would not reimburse
them in full. Thus, if the two hypothetical couples described earlier were
eligible for the deduction proposed by Pechman, the after-tax economic
gain generated by the working wife's $ioooo salary would rise by about
$8oo-from $3,600 to about $4,400 for the first couple and from about
$i,6oo to about $2,400 for the second. The credit proposed by Pechman
would provide slightly more relief-an additional $2oo for each couple.
These benefits would not be refused by the two-job married couple, of
course, but neither would they constitute a major economic breakthrough
for the housewife. Furthermore, even these modest allowances would cost
$2.5 to $3 billion at current income and tax levels. 32 More substantial tax
concessions, designed to neutralize the added costs of the secondary wage
131. U.S. BUREAU Op THE CENSUS, U.S. DaP'r op COMMERCE, STATZSrscA. ABSTRACT OF TBE
UNITED STATES 327 (1972 ed.). The table indicates that there were 20,281,000 wives working as of
March 1971.
X32. 1973 JEC Hearings, supra note 92, at 254 (testimony of Joseph Pechman). If employment
increased as a result of the tax allowance, some of the revenue loss would be recouped from the addi-
tional wage-earner income. The 1975 earned-income credit described supra note 129 is estimated to
cost $1.5 billion, despite the severe restrictions on eligibility. TA stnY DEPARTMENT, TRaASUY
NEws 3 (Mar. 1975).
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earner's employment rather than merely mitigate existing law, would obvi-
ously entail a far larger revenue loss.
On balance, I would conclude that employment-generated expenses
are a deterrent to employment outside the home for some wives, especially
at higher income levels, but that their inability to deduct these expenses
in computing tax liability accounts for only a modest fraction of this de-
terrent. An acceptable tax allowance would alleviate such a small part of
this already modest fraction that the number of working wives would prob-
ably not be much affected by the change. Of course, an allowance might
be taken as a symbol, however minor its financial value, of Congressional
"approval" of employment outside the home, but if this is its primary vir-
tue, it should be proposed not as a permanent part of the tax structure,
but rather as a transitional device to be phased out as obstacles to the
employment of wives are eliminated. If forced to predict the future of
such an allowance, however, I would expect it to be attacked as a penalty
on unmarried persons unless expanded to embrace all gainfully employed
taxpayers, rather than praised as a transitional measure for the working
wife.
3. Separate returns for married couples?
As explained earlier, the tax burden on the two-job married couple is
created by two features of today's law-nondeductibility of the increase in
their expenses resulting from the wife's decision to work outside the home
and the fact that her earnings are either aggregated with her husband's
income in computing their tax liability on a joint return or subjected to
a disadvantageous rate schedule if she files a separate return. The first of
these features of today's law, as we have seen, is applicable to anyone who
works, not merely to the working wife, and this weakens the case for a
remedy that is confined to the two-job married couple. But the second-
aggregation of both spouses' incomes if they file a joint return, with the
alternative of an unfavorable separate return-is peculiar to married
couples. This analysis suggests that the status of two-job married couples
could be improved by altering the Hobson's Choice (aggregation on a
joint return versus an unfavorable rate schedule if they file separate re-
turns) now confronting them.
The remedy might take the form of permitting married couples to use
the rate schedule applicable to unmarried persons if they elect to file sepa-
rate returns, rather than compelling them to use the less favorable rate
schedule that is now applicable to married persons filing separately. For
the wife contemplating a job outside the home, this proposal would equal-
ize her tax with that of an unmarried person receiving the same salary,
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assuming that they are entitled to the same exemptions and deductions 3
To be sure, the proposal would give her no tax allowance for the increased
expenses attributable to her employment, but in this respect her position
would be the same as that of an unmarried employee. For two persons
contemplating marriage, the proposal would eliminate the marriage pen-
alty of existing law, since after marriage they could continue to file sepa-
rate returns and pay the same tax as before marriage. Conversely, a two-
job married couple could not reduce their taxes by divorce.
Appealing though it may be to eliminate simultaneously the tax pen-
alty on marriage and the tax reward for divorce, this package should not
be purchased without examining its price tag. The price tag, in brief, is
abandonment of the 1948 principle of imposing the same aggregate tax
on all equal-income married couples, regardless of how the two spouses
contribute to their joint income. The tax liability of married couples would
once again depend, as it did before 1948, on the amount of income attrib-
utable to each spouse.
The achievement of equality in taxes between married couples with the
same income has been so commonly regarded as a permanent part of our
tax structure-adopted in 1948 "for all time"' 1 --that its abandonment by
a current legislative proposal, sponsored by a politically diverse spectrum
of more than i5o Congressmen and Senators, is nothing less than astonish-
ing" Their bill would establish a single rate schedule for all taxpayers,
with the result that married persons would have to file separate returns
and pay taxes based on their individual incomes' This would, of course,
revive the disparity in tax liability among equal-income married couples
that prevailed in common law states before 1948. But it would go further,
by creating similar disparities in community property states where they
have never existed' 7 This is because couples in community property states
133. If the wife's income is very small in proportion to their joint income, however, the use of
separate returns would increase their aggregate tax liability (e.g., tax on joint income of $4o,oo0 is
$2,140; taxes on separate incomes of $36,000 and $4,000 are $12,29o and $69o, or a total of
$i2,98o). In situations of substantially disproportionate contributions to the joint income, a couple
would pay the same on separate returns as they would have paid before marriage but would lose
the tax advantage now conferred on married couples by the joint return rate schedule. See §§ i(b),
i (d).
134. See Pechman, supra note i, at 475-
135. See H.R. 715, 9 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which incorporates two bills introduced in the
92d Congress, H.R. 85o and H.R. 14193. For a list of co-sponsors of these earlier measures see x972
House Hearings, supra note io, at 97.
x36. If H.R. 715 were enacted, the income of a secondary wage earner would no longer be
added to the primary breadwinner's income and be taxed at the latter's marginal rates, but would in-
stead be taxed in its own right at the starting rates applicable to the income of single persons. But
H.R. 7x5 does not authorize the secondary wage earner to deduct the increased expenses caused by
joining the labor force. See notes 2o-2i supra and accompanying text. By leaving this aspect of exist-
ing law intact, it tacitly confirms the argument that these expenses are the result of employment, rather
than marital status. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
137. In the interest of pedantry, a few minor exceptions must be noted: before Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. ioi (1930), see note 36 supra and accompanying text, community income was not always
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TABLE 5
AGGREGATE TAx LIABILITY OP MARRIED COUPLES FILING SEPARATE
RETURNS UNDER PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Income
Ratio $16,000 $32,000 $64,000
1. 100-0 $3,260 $8,660 $24,420
2. 75-25 2,880 7,040 19,320
3. 50-50 2,760 6,520 17,320
NoTE: Based on 1974 joint return rate schedule; the dollar amounts of tax, but not the principle,
would be different under any other schedule. For simplicity, computations are based on taxable
income rather than AGI, thus ignoring effect of deductions.
would not be permitted to divide their earned income equally when filing
separate returns, but instead would have to attribute it to the taxpayer
performing the services. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid rein-
stating the pre-i948 tax advantages of residence in community property
states. But to achieve this understandable objective, the legislation imposes
unequal tax burdens on equal-income married couples in community prop-
erty states, in place of the equality that prevailed in these states before 1948.
The effect of the legislation just described on married couples with
$i6,ooo, $32,ooo, and $64,000 of taxable income, divided between them in
varying proportions," 8 is illustrated by Table 5.
Can these variations in the tax liability of equal-income married couples
be justified? One type of variation-the lower tax on the two-job couples
in Cases 2 and 3 than on the comparable one-job couple in Case -is of
course the central purpose of the proposed legislation, which is concerned
with the two-job couple's "wage earner" expenses and loss of untaxed
household services by virtue of the secondary wage earner's job." ' But
what justifies the variation between Case 2 and Case 3 taxpayers, who are
both two-job couples? If the income is divided 75-25 in Case 2 but 50-5o
in Case 3 because the secondary wage earner in Case 2 works shorter
hours, the difference between them might reflect lower wage earner ex-
penses or a greater opportunity to perform part-time household services
(or both) in Case 2 than in Case 3. But if the secondary wage earner in
equally divisible between the spouses, at least in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service, and com-
munity property couples with separate income were, pro tanto, subject to tax disparities similar to
those of couples in common law states.
138. For the 1969 frequency distribution of various husband-wife earning ratios, by adjusted
gross income classes, see 1972 House Hearings, supra note io at 8x, table I (testimony of Hon. Edwin
S. Cohen). Cohen's figures show that in over 50% of all cases the lower-earning spouse earns nothing,
while in over 70% of the cases the lower-earning spouse earns less than 20% of the higher-earning
spouse's income. In less than xo% of the cases does the lower-earning spouse earn from 41% to
50% of the higher-earning spouse's income.
139. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
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both instances is engaged in full-time employment, it is harder to justify
a differential in tax liability. If the secondary wage earner's domestic ser-
vices would be more valuable in Case 3 than in Case 2, a lower tax on Case
3 couples could perhaps be defended as compensation for the greater loss
attributable to deprivation of these services, but the factual predicate for
this argument is quite dubious.
Table 4 illustrates another aspect of the proposed legislation-the fact
that its benefits rise with income. It may be that some expenses of the sec-
ond spouse's employment (e.g., the cost of suitable clothing) rise similarly,
but it is less likely that the value of the lost housekeeping services rises
progressively with the salary that the secondary wage earner can command
on leaving the home. Indeed, at the top of the income pile, where the
benefits of the proposed legislation would be greatest, a typical married
couple may spend as much for domestic help when one spouse works as
when both work, and the wife's entry into the labor force may not signifi-
cantly increase her expenses for lunches, clothing, transportation, and other
job-related items. 40 Yet under the proposed legislation, a couple with
$ioo,ooo of earned income would pay about $45,ooo if the income is en-
tirely attributable to one spouse, about $36,500 if it is divided in the ratio
75-25, and only $34,000 if it is equally divided between them.
In discussing the proposed uniform rate schedule for single and mar-
ried taxpayers, I have focused on its effect on two-job couples. In fact, the
legislation is not so limited; it applies to investment as well as earned in-
come, and therefore embraces no-job and one-job married couples as well
as two-job couples. For taxpayers with investment income, its impact would
depend on the way their income was divided inter sese and their willing-
ness to alter this proportion to save taxes. In discussing the effect of the
proposed legislation on earned income, I pointed out that the tax differ-
entials illustrated by Table 4 are not very precisely related to economic
differences between one-job and two-job married couples, or between two-
job couples who receive their income equally and those whose earnings are
disparate. But the differentials are even harder to justify if all or a substan-
tial part of the income is from investments rather than personal services;
the tax savings attributable to an equal division of investment income be-
tween husband and wife (which produces the lowest tax) may reflect the
fact that they inherited equal fortunes, rather than that they are employed
outside the home at equal salaries. Moreover, if their income is not realized
in the most favorable ratio (5o-5o), they can reshuffle it by gifts of their
income-producing property, either to equalize their investment income if
their earned income is already equal (or zero) or to counterbalance the
140. See notes x2,-26 supra and accompanying text.
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effect of unequal amounts of earned income' 4 No comparable oppor-
tunity to approach or reach a 50-50 split is open to couples with income
derived solely from personal services, however, since an assignment of
such income is ineffective under Lucas v. Earl'42
By rewarding couples who divide their income-producing property so
as to equalize their income, the proposed legislation would abandon a
major, almost universally praised result of the 1948 income-splitting joint
return-the irrelevance of "bedchamber" transfers of property. During the
I93O's and i94o's, one ingenious husband-wife arrangement after another
was invented by private tax lawyers in an effort to shift investment income
from one spouse to another without a corresponding change in ownership
or control of the underlying property, while their equally resourceful coun-
terparts in the Internal Revenue Service contested these devices with every
legislative, administrative, and judicial weapon in the government's ar-
senal. Both sides laid down their arms in 1948 when the attribution of in-
come between husband and wife became irrelevant if they filed a joint
return. To be sure, there have been continued skirmishes over the validity
of parent-child and other donor-donee transfers. But for emotional and
prudential reasons, these transfers are likely to be smaller in amount and
less frequent than husband-wife transfers, and hence they impose less stress
on the tax system's enforcement machinery 43
The proposed separate-return legislation would revive another source
of turmoil that has been quiescent since 1948-the allocation of deductions
between husband and wife.' 4 Income-related items can be assigned with
141. It has been argued that this is a minor matter because persons who are prone to tax
avoidance have already shifted their investment income to children. See 1973 JEC Hearings, supra
note 92, at 233 (testimony of Grace Blumberg). I doubt the validity of this factual assertion; transfers
of property to children have always been more deterred by fears of ingratitude than transfers to a
spouse. Countermeasures can be drafted (e.g., taxing investment income to the donor in specified
circumstances even if no strings were retained), but their acceptability is another matter. For an-
other remedy, see note X43 infra.
142. 281 U.S. iI1 (930). See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
X43. For a proposal to eliminate the marriage penalty on earned but not investment income, see
S. 3826, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (I974). For a discussion of the concept see z973 JEC Hearings, supra
note 92, at 147 (testimony of Oscar Gray). See also 120 CoNG. R~c. 148o5-o6 (daily ed. Aug. 13,
1974) (remarks of Senator Mathias). As drafted, the legislation overshoots its objective by computing
a hypothetical marriage penalty that in some instances exceeds today's actual penalty (e.g., husband
with S2 4 ,oo0 of earned income and Si2,ooo of investment income, wife with $8,o0o of earned in-
come-actual penalty under 1974 rates is $i8o, but allowance would be $280). This defect could be
corrected by a complex technical change, but the amount of the allowance could then be altered by
transfers of income-producing property from one spouse to the other. Moreover, like the legislation
illustrated by Table 5, S. 3826 would confer differential benefits on equal-income, two-job couples,
the benefits depending on the ratio of one spouse's earned income to the other's. S. 3826 also would
require the allocation of deductions between husband and wife. For a discussion of this problem, see
note 144 infra and accompanying text.
144. Prior to 7948, deductions were presumably attributable to the taxpayer who incurred the
expene and not to the taxpayer who eventually paid it. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d
8xo (8th Cir. 1931) (holding that the voluntary assumption of the liability of another does not give
rise to a deduction as an "ordinary and necessary business expense," "business loss," or "tax paid").
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relative ease to the spouse whose income generated the expense, though
the allocation of interest on debt for which they are jointly liable and some
other items could be troublesome. The principles for allocating itemized
personal deductions are less evident, however, and it might be necessary
to assign them in the ratio that each spouse's adjusted gross income bears
to their joint adjusted gross income. This seems arbitrary as to items that
bear a special relationship to one spouse rather than the other (e.g., alimo-
ny, interest on property held in separate ownership, contributions to one
spouse's college, and employee moving expenses), especially if they main-
tain separate financial accounts. Since dollars are fungible, such intra-
spousal bookkeeping is quite artificial, but the very concept of separate tax
returns requires a pretense of financial separatism.
4. Conclusion.
The search for a remedy for the two-job couple's complaint has taken
us far afield. They incur expenses that are not incurred by the one-job
married couple, but on analysis it turns out that these stem from employ-
ment, not marital status, thus casting doubt on the fairness of a remedy
that is confined to the two-job married couple. At the same time, a more
inclusive earned-income allowance, granted to all gainfully employed tax-
payers, would grant no distinctive relief, nor would it be of symbolic value,
to the working wife. Moreover, while the great cost of such an allowance
could in theory be recouped solely from taxpayers with unearned income,
it is more likely that some and perhaps most of the cost of recoupment
would be imposed on the very taxpayers who get the allowance.
The other principal approach to the complaint of the two-job married
couple is also fraught with troublesome issues. The enactment of a single
rate schedule for all taxpayers, regardless of their marital status, would
restore some or all of the tax rules applicable to family income before 1948.
Depending on the details of the legislation, this would mean (a) unequal
tax burdens for many equal-income married couples, depending on whether
their income stems from one job, two jobs, investments, or a combination
of earned and unearned sources; (b) restoration of the tax advantages of
residence in community property states-or, as a device to eliminate these
advantages, the development of rules attributing community income to
one spouse rather than equally to both;.45 and (c) revival of the problem
The test as to the allocation of dependency deductions centered on who actually paid for the support
of the child.
The allocation rule after 1948 is that a taxpayer will be allowed a deduction only for expenses
actually paid. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-66, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 6o (holding that where the husband and
wife maintain a joint checking account in which each apparently has an identical interest, there is
a rebuttable presumption that the expenses paid from the account are paid equally by the two parties).
145. Analogous attribution rules are currently found in § 91 X (c) (3) (exclusion of income earned
by nonresident; amount computed without regard to community property laws applicable to the
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of income splitting between spouses, a subject that has been virtually qui-
escent since 1948, along with the related problem of allocating deductions
between the two spouses.
E. Summary
Part III of this Article has been concerned with the bearing that the fol-
lowing factors might have on the relative taxpaying capacities of single
persons and married couples:
i. An obligation to support two persons.
2. The enjoyment of economies of scale in housing, food, etc.
3. The benefit of untaxed household services.
4. Expenses of commuting to work, dressing to suit the job, etc.
A plausible case can be made for taking each of these characteristics into
account in fixing tax liabilities. But a major theme in the foregoing discus-
sion was that none is unique to married couples. Table 6 illustrates this
troublesome fact by indicating the extent to which these factors are charac-
teristic of each of nine patterns of domestic life. Inspection of Table 6 dis-
closes that only two of these nine variations possess identical characteristics
(viz., a single wage earner living with a nonemployed dependent and a
one-job married couple). The table is confined to one-person and two-per-
son households; expanded to embrace larger groups, it would present an
even more complex array.'46
Thus, the characteristics that, in the view of important segments of
public opinion, affect taxpaying capacities and hence ought to be taken
into account in fixing tax liabilities are dispersed like patches in a crazy
quilt. Every legislative disposition of the issues must distinguish between
taxpayers with equally plausible claims, and is therefore virtually fated
to be both overinclusive and underinclusive when judged from one per-
spective or another. It follows that there can be no peace in this area, only
an uneasy truce.
couple's income), § 1304(c) (3) (community income attributed to earner in applying income averaging
rules), and § 6oI3(e)(,) (A) ("innocent" spouse relieved of tax liability for income attributable to
the other spouse, such attribution being made without regard to community property laws). See also
Renoir v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1963); Fink v. United States, 454 F-ad 1387, 1392
(CL Cl. 1972).
146. See J. Pechman, Exercise on the Tax Treatment of the Family, Jan. 14, 1972 (unpublished
paper on file with author). In this imaginative essay Pechman asks the reader to resolve a deadlock
in a task force of tax lawyers and economists who have been appointed by a hypothetical President-
elect to devise a new federal income tax before his inauguration. The experts cannot agree on the
proper differentiation among families of different size, composition, and number of earners. The
reader, therefore, is asked by Pechman to recommend the tax liability to be imposed on each of six
categories of family units (single person without dependents, one-job childless married couple, widow
with one child, two-job childless couple, two-child, one-job married couple, and four-child, two-job
married couple) at 5 different income levels.
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TABLE 6




to of Imputed earner
Feed Scale Income Expenses
1. Single person
(a) Employed
(1) Living alone 1 No No Yes
(2) Sharing expenses with non-
dependent employed roommate 1 Yes No Yes
(3) Living with nonemployed dependent 2 Yes Yes Yes
(b) Nonemployed (investment income)
(1) Living alone 1 Yes No
(2) Sharing expenses with non-
dependent employed roommate 1 Yes Yes No
(3) Living with nonemployed dependent 2 Yes Yes-Yes No
2. Married couple
(a) Neither spouse employed (investment income) 2 Yes Yes-Yes No
(b) One spouse employed 2 Yes Yes Yes
(c) Both spouses employed 2 Yes No Yes-Yes
NOTE: "Yes-Yes" denotes 2 persons with the relevant characteristics.
III. DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS
A. Background
The Revenue Act of 1913 granted every taxpayer a personal exemption
of $3,000, plus an additional $i,ooo if married, and this special allowance
was extended by the Revenue Act of 1916 to any "head of a family,' 47 but
neither act made any separate provision for the taxpayer's children or other
dependents. In 1917, however, Congress authorized the head of a family
to deduct $2oo for each dependent child under the age of i8 or incapable
of self-support because mentally or physically defective 48 In later years,
this allowance was gradually broadened in scope and increased in amount.
Now set at $75o,' it embraces a wide variety of persons who (a) are either
related to the taxpayer by blood, marriage, or adoption, or reside with him
as a member of his household, (b) receive over half of their support for
147. Revenue Act of x916, ch. 463, § 7(a), 39 Stat. 761. To qualify as head of a family, the
taxpayer had to support in one household at least one other person closely connected with the tax-
payer by blood, marriage, or adoption; such support could be based on a moral or legal obligation.
Grandparents, in-laws, stepchildren, and aunts and uncles-in addition to the core family-were
sufficiently "closely connected" for the taxpayer to qualify if he in fact supported them. See I.T. 34xo,
1940-2 CUM. BULL. 86.
148. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § o203(s), 40 Stat. 300.
149. § 151(b).
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TABLE 7
DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED ON 1970 PERSONAL TAX RETURNs*
Number of Number of
Returns Exemptions
Type of Dependent (in Thousands) (in Thousands)
Children living at home 31,427 73,754




* Sou cE: U.S. DEr'T oF TnREAsuy, 1970 STATisrica OF INCOME 107, Table 21 (1972). Total of first
column exceeds 33.5 million because some returns claimed more than one type of dependent.
the calendar year from the taxpayer,' and (c) have less than $750 of gross
income.'' The gross-income restriction is, in general, not applicable to
children of the taxpayer who are under the age of 19 or who are full-time
students,' and the other requirements are also subject to many refinements
and qualifications. Of the 74.3 million returns filed in 1970, 33.5 million
returns claimed a total of 78.1 million dependency exemptions, the over-
whelming majority of which were for children living at home, as Table 7
indicates.
It is a reasonable inference that most of these dependency exemptions
are for children whom the taxpayer is legally obligated to support. But
some are for adult children and other persons, who qualify for the deduc-
tion even though the taxpayer's contributions are prompted not by legal
compulsion but by moral responsibility, family pressure, generosity or
other impulses that only a psychoanalyst could expose.
B. Propriety of the Exemption
There is no consensus on the propriety of tax allowances for dependents,
but four positions can be described.
i. Dependents as "consumption."
At one extreme, amounts spent by the taxpayer for the support of others
are said to be a form of pleasurable consumption, a characterization im-
plying that these expenditures are no more entitled to a tax allowance than




1 53. See L. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPrIONS IN THE INCOmE TAx 13-14 (1968) ("expendi-
tures for the care and education of children and for the support of other dependents are usually in the
public interest [but] . . . they are also . . . forms of consumption"); H. SImONs, supra note 99, at
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the taxpayer's children, whom he is compelled by law to support, the ex-
penditures are said to be an indulgence in personal preferences because the
decision to procreate is voluntary. (Even before the advent of the Pill, it
was argued that couples who preferred action to abstinence should not be
rewarded by the Treasury.) Financial aid to the taxpayer's brothers, sisters,
and more distant relatives is even more voluntary than a parent's support
of minor children, since it can be terminated at any time without breach-
ing a legal obligation. The only dependency allowance that can survive
this dependents-as-consumption analysis is a provision for the cost of sup-
porting the taxpayer's parents under legal compulsion; until modern tech-
nology enables taxpayers to avoid having parents, these payments will
entail no voluntary choice, except abstention from parricide.
Although advocates of the dependents-as-consumption theory ordinari-
ly are willing to tolerate a tax allowance for the cost of supporting minor
children at the subsistence level, a rigorous application of the theory would
exclude even this concession. If the parents have more than enough income
to support themselves, why not tax them, and remedy any resulting de-
ficiency in the children's standard of living by governmental grants at the
normal welfare level?" Another corollary of the dependents-as-consump-
tion theory (not noticed, so far as I can recall, in the literature) is that the
dependent should be taxed on expenditures for his support, as though these
amounts were the price charged by him for providing the personal satis-
factions "consumed" by his patron. For example, the price of a theater
ticket is simultaneously a nondeductible consumption expenditure by the
playgoer and taxable income to the paid entertainer, and expenditures for
the support of dependents arguably serve the same dual function.
In point of fact, theorists espousing the dependents-as-consumption ar-
gument do not ordinarily press it to its dryly logical extreme. The ambiv-
alence of Henry Simons is a good example of the latitudinarian attitude
of a sensible man. Thus, in an extended discussion of the tax treatment of
dependents, he says that "one is tempted to urge substantial concessions"
140 ("it would be hard to maintain that the raising of children is not a form of consumption on the
part of the parents-whether one believes in subsidizing such consumption or not"); Bridges, Family
Need Differences and Family Tax Burden Estimates, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 424 n.8 (197 ) ("having
children voluntarily can be viewed as a form of consumption by the parents"). I do not mean to sug-
gest that these authors consistently oppose all allowances for family responsibilities, but they usually
are hostile to tax allowances for consumption expenditures, and seldom offer any grounds for dis-
tinguishing among forms of consumption.
154. Protagonists of the theory that direct government subsidies are more efficient and equitable
than, and should therefore replace, tax allowances have not yet listed this proposal on their agenda,
but let us not be impatient. The Tax Expenditure Budget for the fiscal year 1976 lists dependency
exemptions as tax expenditures only as respects "student age 19 or over" (which appears to be a
shorthand reference to children who are either full-time students or x9 years of age and who are
themselves claiming a personal exemption for their income) but not other dependency exemptions.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYsES, BUDGET OF Tnsz UNITED STATEs GOVERN-
MENT, 1976, at io8-o 9 (1975).
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for taxpayers supporting "numerous dependents," that the credits for minor
dependents "should vary directly with the family income," and that there
should be "generous deductions" for the support of persons outside the
taxpayer's household. But then Simons argues for an income tax graduated
by reference to the taxpayer's "periodic accretions of means, and with rel-
atively little regard for the manner in which the means are employed."
Next we are told that "as a matter of principle, gifts are consumption to
the donor and therefore not properly deductible," that "it would be hard
to maintain that the raising of children is not a form of consumption on
the part of parents," and that "[i]f the training of a few children is made
the object of expenditures involving a disproportionate share of the com-
munity's resources, that ...is something which the rules of the game
should not encourage." Finally, when Simons moves from these observa-
tions to his recommendations for legislative action, he says that his argu-
ment does not imply disapproval "of small, fixed credits with respect to
minor children or others who are incapable of self-support and are, in fact,
primarily dependent on the particular taxpayers" and that "small and fool-
proof concessions of the kind now [1938] commonly made are not incom-
patible with reasonably close adherence to simple general rules."' 5 Thus,
despite his advocacy of the dependents-as-consumption theory, Simons ev-
idently did not object (at least as respects minor children) to the depen-
dency allowance in force in 1938, which authorized a deduction of $400
for every person under i8 years of age or incapable of self-support who was
dependent on and received his chief support from the taxpayer s°
2. Dependents as "investment."
The dependents-as-consumption theory is occasionally buttressed by sug-
gestions that the taxpayer's expenditures to support dependents, especially
minor children, are investments whose payoff will come in the future if
the taxpayer needs financial aid from his erstwhile beneficiaries. So viewed,
the cost of supporting dependents should no more be deductible than pre-
miums paid for insurance against personal calamities or amounts invested
in marketable securities.lrt
I know of no attempt to pursue the dependents-as-investment theory
155. H. SIMOSs, supra note 99, at 137-41, pas5im. In these passages, Simons wanders back and
forth between income and death taxation, but I take the quoted comments to relate to income taxation.
156. See also H. SIMoNs, FEDERAL Tax REFoRM 54 (195o) (proposing a $250 exemption for
dependents "after the war," i.e., World War H).
157. A dependency deduction was denied in Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.O. 927 (i96o), to
a taxpayer whose support of the alleged dependent was intended as compensation for present or future
housekeeping services rather than motivated by affection, charity or like impulses. However appro-
priate this restriction might be in applying § 152(a) (9), see note x73 infra, it has not been thought
applicable to run-of-the-mill dependency claims for children, even if they wash dishes and mow the
lawn. See also note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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rigorously, or to explore its implicit corollary that the taxpayer would be
entitled to a belated deduction if his children are unable or refuse to sup-
port him in his hour of need. (Did King Lear incur a deductible loss from
abandonment or embezzlement?) For the peasant in Bangladesh, children
may be an informal social security system; they are often regarded as "the
poor man's capital" in the folklore of poverty. But the concept has made
little headway in the analysis of our society, and tax theorists, probably
fearing its exotic or even faintly comic overtones, have used it only as a
makeweight argument when debating the propriety of tax allowances for
dependents. If the current vogue for economic theories of familial and
other interpersonal relationships grows,"8 however, the dependents-as-in-
vestment rationale may yet come to rival the dependents-as-consumption
rationale.
3. Dependents as reducing taxpaying capacity.
In sharp contrast to the theory that the support of dependents is a form
of personal consumption that the tax law should disregard is the theory
that taxpaying capacity depends on the number of mouths that the tax-
payer feels legally or morally obligated to feed. Like marriage to a non-
employed spouse, parenthood costs money; indeed, it is more costly, since
infants consume rather than supply unpaid household services, thus absorb-
ing time and energy that the parents might overwise have devoted to ac-
tivities benefitting only themselves. To be sure, nobody forced the taxpayer
to procreate, but this does not mean that the cost of supporting children
is no more entitled to legal recognition than the cost of maintaining a yacht.
For one thing, the decision to have children is irreversible; they cannot be
abandoned, like a hobby that has become burdensome or boring. More-
over, society feels an obligation to support the children-but not the hobby-
if the taxpayer is unable to do so. No one but a tax theorist, it might be
asserted, could fail to see the difference. For these reasons, it is argued, the
taxpayer's taxpaying capacity is reduced by parenthood (and, in most cir-
cumstances, by the support of other dependents) to a degree that should be
reflected in his tax liability.
Another response to the dependents-as-consumption theory is that
amounts spent for the support of dependents are consumed by the depen-
dent, not by the person providing the support, and should therefore be
taxed to the former. To the extent of their legal obligation to support their
children (and perhaps even beyond that limit), parents can be appropri-
ately likened to conduits, whose receipts should be taxed not to them but
to those who receive the food, clothing, and shelter for which the funds
158. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973).
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are expended. In short, the ultimate tax issue in this area is not whether
income has been received, but to whom an agreed amount of income should
be taxed.'
4. Population policy.
I should perhaps take note here of another set of attitudes toward the
dependency exemption, concerned with its relation to population policy.
If a rising birth rate is a Good Thing for the nation, generous dependency
allowances may seem appropriate, but if a reduction in the birth rate is the
desired national objective, dependency allowances may be criticized as
counterproductive, like a subsidy for polluting the environment with non-
returnable bottles.' While neither side of this argument can offer any
statistical evidence of the effect of tax allowances on the national birth rate,
I doubt that even the most computerized econometrician weighs the value
of a dependency exemption before procreation. Perhaps the dependency
allowance, at least for children, is more important as a symbol of national
policy than as an influence on the birth rate. If so, denial of the deduction
for a year or two after the birth of an "excess" child may be symbol enough,
and if the allowance might thereafter be restored to the antisocial parents in
order to measure their taxpaying capacity more adequately. After all, even
convicted criminals get some of their civil rights back after they have paid
their debt to society.
C. Alternative Types of Dependency Allowances
If accepted, the theory that dependents reduce the taxpaying capacity
of their patrons can be translated into any of a number of statutory forms.
One approach, which came close to winning Henry Simons' endorsement
despite his professed adherence to the dependents-as-consumption theory,
is to allow the taxpayer to deduct expenditures for the support of depen-
dents (as though the income on receipt were subject to an obligation to
share it with others) and to require the dependents to include the same
amount on their personal tax returns. 6 This remedy resembles the income
159. See note ioo supra and accompanying text.
x6o. A third approach, neutrality, is based on the ground that the government should not inter-
vene in a matter so personal as procreation. Whether neutrality is achieved by granting, or by denying,
dependency allowances depends on whether taxpaying capacity is best measured with, or without,
such allowances. Neutrality, therefore, is a destination, not a guidepost. See generally Schaffer & Ber-
man, Tax Exemptions and the Birthrate: The Singleminded Approach to Public Policy, 3 ENvrmoN.AFF. 687 (4974
i61. After discussing this approach, Simons says that "[s]ome concessions of this sort seem
necessary to equitable relative taxation of persons with similar earnings and different family obliga-
tions." H. SnioNs, supra note 99, at 138-39. If I read him correctly, he ultimately rejects this idea
not as a matter of principle, but primarily because "compensating rate differences" (to recoup the
lost revenue and restore some unspecified degree of progression) are not likely to be enacted-a
political judgment that, of course, would vary with time. See also note ioo supra.
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splitting sanctioned by pre-I948 law for married couples in community
property states, which similarly reflected the divided interests in their joint
income by permitting it to be divided between them for tax purposes1 -
It also resembles the current statutory treatment of alimony, which is both
deductible by the spouse who makes the payments. 3 and taxable to the
recipient 6
A statutory deduction for expenditures on dependents, conditioned on
inclusion of the same amount in the dependent's taxable income, would
be difficult to administer if it required measurements of the amount actually
spent for the support of each dependent. Amounts paid or earmarked for
the dependent's clothing, medical expenses, education and other individual
needs might be accurately determined, at least by taxpayers with a talent
for domestic bookkeeping, but general household expenses would have to
be allocated on a fractional or other basis between the taxpayer and his
dependents. A cruder but more feasible way of splitting income between
the taxpayer and his dependents would be the allocation of a prescribed
fraction of the taxpayer's income (e.g., io percent) to each dependent. This
fractional share would be excluded from the taxpayer's income as though
he were a mere conduit and taxed to the dependent.
A more conventional statutory response to the reduced taxpaying capac-
ity attributable to the taxpayer's support of dependents is a deduction or
credit, without any compensating requirement that the dependent report
this amount as income. The allowance could vary with the taxpayer's in-
come, or with the actual or estimated amount of support provided by him,
but Congress has consistently fixed the allowance at a flat amount, regard-
less of the taxpayer's income, ever since it first authorized a dependency
exemption in 1917.
Being a flat deduction, the dependency allowance increases in value as
the taxpayer's income and hence his marginal tax rate rises, but it is not
otherwise related to the level of the taxpayer's income or his expenditures
for the support of his dependents. If the function of the allowance is to take
account of the actual cost of supporting children, it does not perform very
well. To be sure, it may pass muster at the bottom of the income ladder,
where it is augmented by the low-income allowance. A childless couple
pays no tax unless their income exceeds $2,800, which is almost identical
with the amount needed for a poverty-level budget 6  With two children,
they can receive another $i,5oo without tax, and this exempt amount is
very close to the estimated cost of supporting the children at the same sub-
x6". See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. io (3930).
x63. § 71.
164. § 215.
x65. See 1972 House Hearings, supra note 3o, at 8i, chart 2 (statement of Hon. Edwin S. Cohen).
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sistence level. However, at higher-but by no means jet-set levels-the flat
allowance of $75o per child is rapidly outpaced by the actual cost of sup-
porting children, and provides only token differentiation between childless
couples and families at middle- and upper-income levels. Indeed, a uniform
allowance is bound to be wrong most of the time; it is worse than a broken
clock, which is right once every twelve hours.
Even so, a uniform allowance might be tolerated for families in the
stratosphere (e.g., above $iooooo). I have argued earlier that efforts to
relate tax liabilities to differences in the relative cost of living for single
persons and married couples of equal income becomes difficult if the per-
sons being compared are extremely rich 6 In deciding how much differ-
ence there should be between the tax liability of a childless couple with
$2oo,ooo of income and that of a couple with the same income and two
minor children, one must similarly resort to socio-economic criteria as
vague as those that underlie judgments about the degree of progression in
the rate schedule. When the comparison is between childless couples and
larger family units at more modest income levels, however, the grounds
for decision become somewhat more solid, although interpersonal com-
parisons always embody an unavoidable residue of fiat. For those who
believe that the tax burden should reflect the actual cost of supporting de-
pendents at the family's income level, rather than at a mere subsistence
level, the ultimate issue is whether an allowance that rises with income
would accomplish this objective better than a flat allowance. The formula
for a rising allowance will, in the end, be arbitrary, but it will almost cer-
tainly be less so than a uniform allowance.
Although the $750 dependency deduction of existing law makes no
effort to measure the actual cost of supporting children at varying income
levels, its value rises with the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. At the bottom
of the income ladder, an exemption is worth $io5 (i.e., 14 percent of $750),
or less if the couple's income is so low that they cannot "use" the deduction
in full; at the top, it saves them $525 (i.e., 70 percent of $750). This increase
in the exemption's value, although it does not keep pace with the escalating
cost of supporting children as family income rises, has been stigmatized as
"regressive" by many critics, and they have proposed the substitution of
either a deduction that declines in amount with income or a credit of a
fixed amount against the taxpayer's tax liabilityY7 A credit would be a less
166. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
z67. These proposals are discussed in Brannon & Morss, The Tax Allowance for Dependents:
Deductions versus Credits, 26 NAT'L TAx J. 599 (1973).
A declining (or "vanishing") exemption would be reduced according to a formula related to
the taxpayer's income. For example, if the $75o dependency exemption of current law were reduced
by one dollar for each three dollars of adjusted gross income above Sio,ooo, the allowance would
decline as follows: $io,ooo (or below) AGI: $750 exemption; $10,75o AGI: $5oo exemption; $11,soo
AGI: $250 exemption; $12,250 (or above) AGI: $o exemption.
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drastic remedy than a vanishing exemption, since it would be granted to
all taxpayers, regardless of income. If "refundable" (i.e., payable to the
taxpayer in cash if and to the extent it exceeded his tax liability), it would
benefit nontaxpayers as well as those with a positive tax liability.
Although both of these substitutes for the deduction of existing law
would increase the progressivity of the tax structure, this result would be
accomplished by imposing, at moderate and upper income levels, identical
(or, in the case of a modest credit, substantially identical) tax burdens on
families of disparate sizes. This choice between progression and differen-
tiation by family size, however, is not an unavoidable dilemma (as often
implied by commentators), but a false dichotomy. In fact, any desired de-
gree of progression is entirely compatible with tax burdens that vary with
family size.
Progression is primarily a question of "vertical" equity-should there
be a difference in tax liability between two otherwise comparable taxpayers
with different amounts of income?-while dependency allowances raise
a question of "horizontal" equity-should there be a difference between
a taxpayer with dependents and one with the same amount of income but
no dependents? Proponents of progression will answer the first question
with a resounding "yes," but with complete consistency can answer the
second question with either a "yes" or a "no."1 ' Conversely, opponents
of progression will answer "no" to the first question, but may respond with
either a "yes" or a "no" to the second. Whether the rate schedule is steep
or gentle, it is entirely feasible to distinguish taxpayers at any given income
by reference to family size. Another way of putting the same point is that
the revenue cost of any dependency allowance can be recouped by increas-
ing the average tax rate on all taxpayers at the income level "responsible"
for the revenue loss.
Of course, a necessary result of any dependency allowance is that a tax-
payer with dependents will pay less tax than some unencumbered tax-
payers with less income; the more generous the allowance, the more pro-
nounced will be this phenomenon. But if taxpaying capacity is reduced
by family responsibilities, this phenomenon should be welcomed, not crit-
icized.
168. A per capita division (i.e., among parents, children, and grandchildren) at low and middle
income levels, with each member of the family being taxed on his or her aliquot share, was recom-
mended by Sidney Webb in a Fabian Society tract criticizing the British income tax from a socialist
perspective. Webb coupled this proposal with a recommendation for greater progression, and thus
obviously saw no conflict between the two. Webb, supra note 56, at 236-47.
Alfred Pigou put the point succinctly when he wrote that differentiation for family size at
high income levels "is not a question of giving rich people privileges as compared with poor people,
but of adjusting the burden fairly within each income class between people whose situations are
different." A. PIGou, The Report of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, in EssAYs 555 APPLED
EcoNo sics 126, 134 (1924).
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In this connection, it is worth recalling that the "demogrant" plan spon-
sored by Senator George McGovern during the 1972 presidential election
campaign was part of a broad tax reform proposal that would have elim-
inated virtually all of the personal deductions and exemptions of existing
tax law while retaining family size as a basis for differentiating the tax
burden 6  Indeed, under the McGovern plan, family size was a far more
important determinant of tax liability than it is under existing law. Thus,
the current difference in tax liability at the $2oooo taxable income level
between a childless couple and a couple with three children is $720 under
existing law, but it would have risen to $3,000 under the McGovern pro-
posal, and even at higher levels there would have been dramatic increases
in the tax effect of family size. The McGovern plan did not lack critics,
but I do not recall any suggestion that the expanded role played by family
size in differentiating the tax burden was inconsistent with a commitment
to progression. Moreover, even the most progressive rate schedule should
be applied to the "right" taxpayer, and if the dependent rather than the
parent is the appropriate person to be taxed on amounts spent for his or
her support (the "conduit" theory outlined above), both the McGovern
plan and the dependency exemption of existing law seriously overtax the
parent and can therefore be described as cases of progression run amuck.
D. Statutory Rules
As pointed out earlier, the dependency exemption entered the tax law
in 1917 as an allowance for dependent children under the age of i8 or
incapable of self-support by virtue of mental or physical disability. The
allowance was expanded in 1918 to embrace any person who was "depen-
dent upon and receiving his chief support from the taxpayer," if under
18 or incapable of self-support, and it remained in this form until 1944. Dur-
ing this period, a relationship of blood, marriage, or adoption between the
dependent and the taxpayer was not necessary, and the language "depen-
dent upon ... the taxpayer" was interpreted to include voluntary support,
rather than restricted to obligations imposed on the taxpayer by law 7
Without explaining why the existing definition of "dependent" was not
satisfactory, in 1944 the House Committee on Ways and Means recom-
mended and Congress enacted amendments (a) requiring the dependent
to be related to the taxpayer by blood (within a specified degree of prox-
imity), marriage, or adoption, (b) eliminating the requirement that the
dependent be under i8 or incapable of self-support, and (c) disqualifying
169. For a description of the "demogrant" plan, see McGovern, George McGovern: On Taxing
& Redistributing Income, x8 N.Y. RPv. Booas, May 4, 1972, at 7-
X70. SeeHammondsv. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 4, 15 (1938).
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dependents with gross income of $5oo or more 1 The qualifying relation-
ships prescribed in 1944, to which only a few minor categories have been
added in later years, were: children and their descendents, stepchildren,
parents and their ancestors, siblings, stepparents and stepsiblings, siblings
by the half blood, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, sons- and daugh-
ters-in-law, parents-in-law, and brothers- and sisters-in-law. No reason was
given by Congress for requiring that one of these relationships (or mar-
riage or adoption) exist between the taxpayer and the dependent. It may
have been thought that the support of distant relatives and other persons
is capriciously personal generosity, and that the taxpayer should be encour-
aged instead to contribute to charitable organizations that have a fiduciary
obligation to compare the needs of all applicants for assistance and to prefer
those who are most "deserving" when tested by generalized standardsY'
But if critics of our national life are correct in discerning a revulsion against
anonymity and bureaucracy and a yearning for spontaneity, perhaps any-
one whom the taxpayer chooses to support should be treated as a "depen-
dent," even if the choice is idiosyncratic.
Once it was decided, for whatever reason, to restrict the dependency ex-
emption to persons related to the taxpayer, the line between "close" and
"remote" relationships was bound to be arbitrary and to result in excluding
some persons despite their intimate emotional ties to the taxpayer. A deter-
mined taxpayer, however, can bring such a person into the charmed circle
by availing himself of section 152(a) (9), enacted in 1954, which permits
persons residing with the taxpayer as members of his household to qualify,
unless the relationship is illicitY Another way to establish a qualifying
relationship is to adopt the dependent. The possibility of using this pro-
cedure with war orphans, whose support in some foreign countries might
cost less than the tax benefit of claiming them as dependents, accounts for
the enactment in 1944 of section 152(b) (3), disqualifying alien dependents,
unless resident in the United States or an adjacent country 7
In addition to requiring that the dependent be linked to the taxpayer
by blood, marriage or adoption, the 1944 legislation provided that persons
with gross income of $5oo (now $75o) or more could not be claimed as
dependents, regardless of the amount spent by the taxpayer for their sup-
171. H.R. REP. No. 13 65,78th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (944).
172. See Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1938) (allowing charitable deduc-
tion for gift to association, although taxpayer was on Board of Directors and "relief' was always
given to friends of Board members). See also Morrell v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1939)
(taxpayer preferred a dependency allowance rather than a charitable contribution deduction, although
usually the opposite would be the case).
173. Section 152(b)(5), which excludes illicit dependents, was enacted in 1958 to provide
statutory support for a conclusion already reached by judicial construction of § 152(a) (9) in Turnip-
seed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758 (1957).
174. Section 152(b)(3) is somewhat broader than its objective required, since it disqualifies
blood relatives as well as adopted dependents. It is also subject to two minor exceptions.
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port. This limitation was presumably intended to disqualify persons who
were not in need of financial assistance.
Viewed in this light, the "gross income" requirement of existing law
is at once too lenient and too severe. It is too lenient because it disregards
receipts and benefits that are excluded from the dependents "gross income"
as defined by the Code, such as the value of owner-occupied residences,
gifts and bequests, state and municipal bond interest, scholarships, and life
insurance proceeds. 7 Whatever may be the validity of the reasons for
excluding these items from gross income in computing tax liability, there
is no reason in theory to disregard them in determining whether a depen-
dent is truly in need of the taxpayer's financial assistance. At the level of
practice, however, the use of a single standard in measuring "gross income"
is administratively convenient. It also mitigates-though only in a rough
and haphazard way--the fact that $750 is insufficient to finance self-support
except at the poverty level and, even then, only for persons living in a
family unit large enough to profit from economies of scale 76
At the same time that the dependent's "gross income" is too lenient,
it is also too severe a yardstick. This is because the dependent's economic
income may be less than his or her statutory gross income, by reason of
business expenses and losses, which are deducted from gross income (in
computing adjusted gross income) rather than in computing gross income
itself. Thus, if the taxpayer's mother receives $8oo of gross rental income,
she may not be claimed as a dependent even if taxes, interest, and repairs
on the rental property resulted in an out-of-pocket loss.
Finally, the provision has an irrational all-or-nothing quality: a single
dollar of "excess" gross income received by the dependent can result in a
loss to the taxpayer of an exemption worth as much as $525 (i.e., 7o percent
of $750). 177
These anomalies were alleviated in 1954, when the gross income limit
was made inapplicable to any dependent child of the taxpayer who is under
the age of 19 or a full-time student. The stated reasons were that the restric-
tion was a "hardship to parents who provide most of the support for their
children, although the latter earns slightly over $6oo [the dollar limit in
19541," and that it put unjustified pressure on the child to stop work just be-
fore earnings reached the statutory limit.1 76 No explanation was given for
175. However, the use of these receipts by the dependent is taken into account in determining
under § 152(a) whether the taxpayer provided more than one-half of the dependent's support, except
for certain scholarships, which are disregarded for this purpose by virtue of § x52(d).
176. See notes 1x-o5 supra and accompanying text.
177. See Cohen v. Commissioner, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 53,312 (953) (exemption denied
because dependent's gross income exceeded permissible limit by $31.68). But see Rives v. Commis-
sioner, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49,287 (1949) (IRS conceded the deduction, even though child
earned 37 cents over the gross income limit).
178. S. REP. No. x622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1954).
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not extending the same relief to other dependents; possibly it was thought
that the problem arose primarily from college students' summer employ-
ment.
The 1954 change has given rise to a new complaint, viz., that a student
with earnings in excess of $750 can take a personal exemption of $75o on
his own return at the same time that his parents are deducting a depen-
dency exemption of $750 on their return if they provided more than half
of his supportY' This "doubling up" of exemptions was not, in fact, a new
phenomenon, since all dependents with income were-and still are--en-
titled to their own personal exemptions, regardless of the dependency
exemptions claimed on their behalf by the taxpayers who support them.
Assume, for example, that a parent supplies more than half of the support
of two 2o-year old children, a student with $751 of gross income, and a
nonstudent with $749 of gross income. Under existing law, the parent will
be entitled to two dependency exemptions, only the first of which has been
singled out for the "doubling up" criticism described above. I have sug-
gested earlier that the dependency allowance is already too meager, and
this argues against further restrictions, but if limits are to be imposed, they
should be consistently applied to all dependents.
IV. TRANSACTIONS WITHIN THE FAmILY
A. Sales of Property
If one spouse sells property to another, any gain must be taken into ac-
count in computing the seller's income, even if they file a joint return' 8
179. The exemption was $6oo (rather than $750) from 1954 to 1970. It should be noted that
the "double exemption" will be less significant for the student than the low income allowance, which
allows any taxpayer to earn $13oo before having to pay any tax. Thus, the combination of personal
exemption and low income allowance allows the student to earn $2050 without paying any tax while
his parents continue to take a $750 dependency deduction. When claimed as a dependent, the stu-
dent's percentage standard deduction or low income allowance is computed by reference to earned
income only, by virtue of § X41(e), enacted in 1971. However, no matter how large an otherwise
qualified child's income may be, the parents may claim a dependency allowance if they provide more
than half of the amount actually used for the child's support. Thus, if a wealthy child saves his or
her own income, or uses it for nonsupport purposes, the indulgent parent's dependency allowance
is not jeopardized. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1 (a) (2) (i) (1971).
The "double exemption" has been criticized as being inequitable and overly generous. For ex-
ample, it is the only dependency exemption designated as a tax expenditure in the fiscal x976 Tax
Expenditure Budget. See OF'pc OF fANAGEMENT AND Bu GT, supra note 154, at io8-og. As Seltzer
has pointed out, however, alternative arrangements also present serious problems. L. Sar zEt, supra
note 153, at 7-8. For example, when the taxpayer is required to add the dependent to his own re-
turn (or when the individual is not qualified as a dependent because he earns over $75o), the de-
pendent's income (or money used to support him) is subjected to a high marginal rate and there is
an implication that the taxpayer has control over the dependent's income. The first of these seems un-
fair; the second is untrue in most situations.
i8o. Such sales may be subject to less favorable treatment than sales to outsiders. See, e.g., ideb
v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. x61, 164 (1963) (bond amortization deductions denied to husband and
wife where purported sale between them appeared to be sham); § X239 (capital gain treatment denied
on certain sales of depreciable property to related taxpayers).
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This adherence to individualism contrasts sharply with the widely espoused
theory that husband and wife constitute a single economic entity. Perhaps
spouses are required to report gain on selling property to each other on
the ground that the sale is evidence that in fact they do not view themselves
as a single economic entity; otherwise, it might be argued, the property
would have been transferred by gift rather than by sale. Whatever the
source of the rule-which may, of course, stem more from legislative in-
difference 8' than legislative concern-it contrasts with the privilege ac-
corded to affiliated corporations to file consolidated returns that disregard
internal transactions and reflect income only when the group deals with
outsiders. 2 Married couples are not granted a similar privilege.
Though gain on a sale of property by one spouse to another is taxed,
losses incurred on such sales cannot be deducted. This restriction, enacted
in 1943 and now embodied in section 267(a) (i), applies not only to sales
to the taxpayer's spouse, but also to sales to ancestors, lineal descendents,
and siblings. 3 Even before section 267's enactment, losses on an intrafamily
sale could be disallowed if the government could prove that the seller did
not actually give up control or sold at an artificially low price; section
267(a) (i) dispenses with an inquiry into such circumstances, which are
often peculiarly within the knowledge of the taxpayer, and disallows the
loss even if the transaction was executed in good faith and at fair market
value. Thus, section 267 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
disallow a loss on stock sold by one spouse because the other spouse simul-
taneously purchased the same number of shares of the same corporation,
even though both sales were effected through brokers on the New York
Stock Exchange at the prevailing market prices. In its opinion, the Court
had this to say about the underlying presupposition of section 267: "The one
common characteristic of these groups [i.e., the family relationships speci-
fied by section 267(a) (i)] is that their members, although distinct legal
entities, generally have a near-identity of economic interests.' 8 4
iSr. Sales by one spouse to another are taxed not by virtue of an affirmative special rule, but
rather because they do not fit within any statutory exception to the general rule of § oo2 (gain on
sales or exchanges of property recognized unless otherwise provided).
X82. §§ 1501-04.
183. See § 267(a), 267(c) ().
184. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947). Despite this "near identity of
economic interests," the purchasing spouse must use his or her own cost, not the seller's cost, in com-
puting loss on a subsequent sale of the property, so that part of the family's actual economic loss will
never be allowed as a tax deduction. (If the second spouse realizes a gain, however, it is recognized
under § 267(d), enacted in 1954, only to the extent that it exceeds the disallowed loss.) Thus, §
267(a)(i) is a more drastic remedy than the "wash sale" rule of § io91, which merely postpones
recognition of the taxpayer's economic loss until his ultimate disposal of the stock, permitting the
loss to be deducted in full at that time.
For the record, it may be worth listing several related problems in the family solidarity area:
Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (husband and wife must be taken
as a unit in applying "insider" liability provision of Securities Exchange Act of 1934; requiring a show-
ing that one spouse was alter ego of the other would undermine effectiveness of statute); Wall Street
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As we have seen, this premise of "a near-identity of economic interests"
within the family underlies the numerous proposals for the aggregation
of family income in computing the group's annual tax liability that have
been advanced by tax theorists. But these proposals, unlike section 267, have
invariably been confined to parents and minor children, excluding adult
children and, a fortiori, more distant relatives, such as grandparents, grand-
children, and siblings. Moreover, no proposal for compulsory family in-
come aggregation-not even between husband and wife-has ever been
accepted by CongressY5 Yet the far more sweeping concept of family sol-
idarity that is embodied in section 267 not only has survived without crit-
icism, but has become the model for a plethora of other restrictions on
intrafamily transactions involving property8
Section 267(a) (i) applies to "sales or exchanges of property," but not
to the manifold other transactions of a business or investment character
between members of a family that may give rise to deductions, such as the
payment of salaries, rent, or interest. In general, the individuality of each
member of a family is respected in passing on the validity of such transac-
tions: parents may deduct compensation paid to children for working in
the family business; interest paid on an intrafamily loan may be deducted
by the borrower; and a tenant may deduct rent paid for the use of property
leased by him from a member of his family. If the deduction reduces the
tax liability of the payor more than it increases the liability of the recipient,
however, the courts scrutinize the underlying transaction closely, demand-
ing proof that its terms are equivalent to an arm's length bargain and that
it serves a purpose other than tax avoidance. Whether the language of "pre-
sumption" is used or not, their working hypothesis is that transactions with
outsiders have a built-in guarantee of good faith and business purpose, but
that intrafamily transactions are less likely to be what they purport to be.
The ultimate source of this doubt is, of course, a judicial view of social
behavior, not an explicit statutory direction to the courts.
Journal, Oct. 28, 1974, at 3, col. 2 (allegation that purchase of stock by corporate executive's wife
violated antifraud provisions of federal securities law; wife quoted as saying "I'm flabbergasted ....
My husband doesn't come home and tell me about his business .. . . I do my own trading. I always
have. I have my own money."); Wall Street journal, Sept. 1g, 1974, at 6, cal. 3 (FPC administrative
law judge resigned, because of wife's stockholdings and directorships in companies affected by FPC
regulations; quoted as saying "[My wife) is an independent thinker. She's a practicing lawyer and
has her own career. She earns more money than I do. [The FPC rules were) promulgated when a
man had full control over his household."); New York Post, July 26, 1972, at 8 (unsuccessful mo-
tion to disqualify juror whose husband had high security clearance as executive of aerospace com-
pany).
185. Congressional refusal to consolidate the income of minor children reached its zenith in the
enactment of § 73. See note 78 supra.
x86. E.g., § 1235 (allowing certain patent royalties to be reported as capital gain rather than
ordinary income, provided the transferee of the patent is not a member of the taxpayer's family);
§ 1237 (allowing gain on certain sales of subdivided real property to be reported as capital gain rather
than ordinary income unless substantial improvements were made by the taxpayer or members of his
family; § 1239, see note x8o supra.
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B. Attribution Rules
Skepticism about intrafamily transactions has been carried to the high-
est level of exquisite intricacy by the Code's numerous stock attribution
rules, which, in prescribing the tax treatment of a wide range of corporate
events, require taxpayers to be treated as constructive owners of stock that
is actually owned by members of their families.'87 Based on the premise
that the family is a single economic unit, the attribution rules can result
in decreasing or disallowing deductions, converting capital gains into or-
dinary income, requiring otherwise unrecognized gains to be recognized,
denying a preferred tax status, and other adverse changes in tax allow-
ances. ' In 1967, it was reported that the attribution rules could apply to
34 different substantive situations (an estimate that almost certainly would
have to be increased today), including such diverse areas as stock redemp-
tions, corporate liquidations, corporate surtax exemptions, personal hold-
ing companies, controlled foreign corporations, stock options, net operating
loss carryovers, and private foundations' 9
In addition to formal attribution rules, the Code contains many other
provisions that saddle taxpayers with the financial interests, status, or trans-
actions of their relatives. Thus, a taxpayer may be taxed more heavily if his
wife is a trustee or beneficiary of a trust established by him, if he becomes
a director or officer of a corporation in which a parent owns stock, or if he
sells a partnership interest to a child rather than to a more distant relative
or unrelated person.' Sometimes these family solidarity rules penalize
an organization rather than (or as well as) the individuals. Thus, a foun-
dation may become subject to the rigorous "private foundation" rules if a
trustee is related to a substantial contributor, and a corporation becomes
a personal holding company if a specified amount of its stock is held by a
limited number of family groups.' In situations of this type, the interests
X87. Stock owned by trusts, partnerships and corporations is also attributed to the beneficial
owners under the statutory rules because of their financial stake in the entity holding the stock. The
discussion in this Article is not concerned with these "beneficial ownership" rules, but only with attri-
bution from one member of a family to another, where the premise of family solidarity may, or may
not, accord with the facts. Where there is "chain" attribution (e.g., from a trust to a beneficiary, and
then from the beneficiary to a member of his or her family), my concern is only with the second link
in the chain.
88. See B. Brrr=nt & J. EusrcE, FEDERAL INCOim TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERs § 9.21 (3 d ed. 197); Goldstein, Bringing the Attribution Rules into Sharper Focus; How
and Where They Apply, 26 J. TAx. 280 (1967); Goldstein, Attribution Rules: Undue Multipliity,
Complexity Can Create Liabilities, 15 Ts..ANE TAx INsT. 384 (1965); Reilly, An Approach to the
Simplification and Standardization of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and
"Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L. REv. 253 (i96o); Ricketts, An Outline of the Four Major
Attribution Rules, How They Operate, 26 J. TAx. 26 (1967); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of
Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 209 (1958).
i89. See Goldstein, Bringing the Attribution Rules into Sharper Focus; How and Where They
Apply, supra note S88; Ricketts, supra note 188.
19o. See §§ 674(d); 677(b); 302(c); 704(e). See also § 1313(c).
x91. See § 509 & 4946 (private foundation); H9 542(a) & 544(a) (2) (personal holding com-
pany). See also § § 552(a) & 554(a)(2) (foreign personal holding company); 99 957-58 (controlled
foreign corporation).
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of innocent bystanders may be seriously damaged by the intrafamily rela-
tionships of complete strangers whose genealogy is unknown to them' 95
The attribution and family solidarity rules are replete with fine distinc-
tions, especially in their treatment of the taxpayer's adult children, siblings,
brothers- and sisters-in-law, and grandparents, who are all treated as part
of the taxpayer's economic family by some rules and excluded from it by
others. The only common denominator of these complex rules is their con-
sistent inclusion of the taxpayer's spouse in the charmed (or tainted) cir-
cle,' but even this is subject to qualification (e.g., sections 672(c) (i) and
674 (d) distinguish between a spouse who lives with, and one who lives
apart from, the grantor of a trust). In theory, the transactions subject to
attribution and family solidarity rules could be classified, and carefully
drafted definitions of "family" could then be assigned to the underlying
transactions in proportion to their sensitivity to family influence. Thus, in
passing on the least sensitive category of transactions, taxpayers would be
charged solely with stock owned by their spouses, the next level of sensi-
tivity would take account of stock owned by minor children and the spouse,
and so on, until the end of the attribution chain (aunts and uncles ? second
cousins once removed?) was reached.
In actuality, it is impossible to fit the punishment so neatly to the crime.
The only basis for deciding when attribution should be imposed and when
the taxpayer should instead be treated as an independent entity is intuition,
and its insights are exhausted when this original judgment is made. If the
divergent definitions of "family" found in existing law were shuffled and
reassigned at random to the operative provisions of the Code, I doubt that
anyone could offer sound reasons for restoring the status quo ante rather
than retaining the new assignments. In the same vein, I would suggest that
selecting one set of existing statutory rules by a throw of dice, and aban-
doning the other rules, would be no more arbitrary than existing law,
which contains a set of seemingly tailor-made rules for each substantive
situation.
C. Escape Hatches
A few of the Code's attribution and family solidarity rules contain es-
cape hatches. Under section 302(c) (2), for example, a taxpayer whose
stock has been redeemed is liberated from the family attribution rules
192. See text accompanying notes 79-SI supra.
193. Although the spousal attribution rules can impose dramatically heavy penalties (limited
only by the size of the couple's corporation or other financial instrumentality), they have escaped the
criticism directed against the much lower marriage penalty imposed by the Tax Reform Act of x969.
See notes I13-x6 supra and accompanying text. Is this because of an assumption that shareholders of
family corporations are less likely to avoid marriage, engage in divorce, or cohabit without marriage
than the two-job married couples who are adversely affected by the 1969 marriage penalty?
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(which, if applicable, would deny capital gain treatment to any gain on
the redemption), if he refrains from becoming an officer or director of the
corporation, if none of the redeemed stock was acquired from a related
person, as defined in section 318(a), during the previous io-year period,
and if certain other conditions are satisfied."' Another example is section
67:2(c), which permits the statutory presumption that certain persons are
"subservient" to the grantor of a trust to be rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence. But most statutory rules do not acknowledge that families
are sometimes dens of hostility rather than lovenests 9  Thus, stock owned
by one spouse is usually attributed to the other spouse despite estrangement
or desertion; often only a legal decree of divorce or separation can cut the
chain 9  As for blood relationships, they are even more permanent ties than
marriage. (An embryo A. P. Herbert might try his hand at "The Attribu-
tion Murder Case," turning on whether public policy would be violated
by allowing Cain to escape attribution from Abel by fratricide.) Even if
Freud himself would be shocked by the reciprocal hatred of persons locked
together by the statutory attribution rules, they seem impervious to the
intrusion of realism, save for the rare statutory provision that can be inter-
preted to permit a judicial exemption.'9
Indeed, their irrebuttable nature is about the only characteristic of the
statutory attribution rules to escape criticism. It has instead elicited unqual-
ified praise from the leading commentators:
These rules of constructive ownership rest on certain assumptions which are
readily supported in the everyday conduct of affairs.... A husband can be re-
garded as "owning" his wife's stock. Tax administration would be severely
handicapped if the rules applied only as presumptions; tax planning, moreover,
would be hazardous if it depended on an analysis of the actual relationship in
each case.' 98
The assertion that rebuttable constructive ownership rules would make tax
planning "hazardous" cannot be accepted without qualification. Since the
attribution rules of existing law almost always operate to the taxpayer's
194. See also § 1563(e) (5) (waiving attribution from a spouse--in restricting corporate surtax
exemptions-if the attributee is not a director, employee, or participant in management).
x95. See, e.g., the court's reference, no doubt based on long experience, to "another inter-
necine struggle over a valuable family estate" in Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 431 (Ioth Cir.
'973).
The statutory rules are confined to family relationships and do not apply to informal alliances-
not even to a commune whose organizing principle is the primacy of love and trust among its
members.
196. For rare exceptions to this custom, see §§ 672(c) (1) and 674(d), which distinguish between
a spouse who lives with the grantor of a trust and one who does not. See also § 143(b) (3) (person
not considered as married if spouse "is not a member of [former's] household").
197. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 51o F.2d 43 (ist Cir. 1975) (holding that attribution be-
tween spouses in applying § 301 (b) (i)-redemption not essentially equivalent to dividend-is not
required in case of family hostility and discord and rejecting the administrative advantages of
"wooden subjugation" to the attribution rules).
198. Ringel, Surrey & Warren, supra note 188, at 209-IO.
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disadvantage, they are not "safe harbor" charts. If they were made rebut-
table,'99 taxpayers who desired certainty could continue to avoid transac-
tions evoking attribution, but those who were convinced of their ability to
rebut the presumption could take their chances. For them, the irrebuttable
presumptions of existing law provide "protection" that they would like to
relinquish.
The assertion that "[t]ax administration would be severely handi-
capped" if attribution were rebuttable is more persuasive, but it overstates
the danger, which could be minimized by waiving attribution only if the
taxpayer clearly proved its unfairness and negated any tax avoidance aroma.
If more safeguards are thought necessary, the privilege could be limited to
stock owned by the taxpayer's siblings, parents, and adult children, 0 to
stock acquired by purchase rather than by gift, and to stock held for a
substantial period of time. As pointed out earlier, existing law already
contains a few escape hatches that are subject to similar limitations."' An-
other possibility is to authorize the Treasury to waive the family attribution
rules when it is satisfied that tax avoidance will not result.20 2
Lacking, as they do, any mechanism to relieve the taxpayer of attribu-
tion from relatives who are clearly independent or hostile, it is surprising
that the attribution rules have not been subjected to more political and even
constitutional attack. Legislation denying privileges, or imposing respon-
sibilities because of the behavior or status of a citizen's relatives may not
be as "suspect" as discrimination based on race or sex, but it ordinarily raises
civil libertarian and, increasingly, judicial hackles. As of now, the Internal
Revenue Code leads the whole corpus juris in imposing disabilities by
virtue of one's family relationships. Customarily praised for its realism,
this practice may come to be seen as imputing guilt by association.! It ishardly necessary to document the growing antipathy to such rules of law, 0"
199. See § 672(c); text accompanying notes 194-95 supra.
2o. For a distinction between adult and minor children in existing law, see § 1563(e) (6) (re-
strictions on corporate surtax exemption), attributing the stock of adult children to a parent only
if he or she owns more than 50% of the stock of the corporation in question.
201. See notes 194-95 supra and accompanying text.
202. For provisions of existing law authorizing such dispensations by the Treasury, see § 367
(exchanges with foreign corporations) and § 3o6(b)(4) (certain dispositions of § 3o6 stock). The
Treasury's procedures in exercising powers of this type should be more formalized and open to pub-
lic scrutiny, but this is not the place for a discussion of this subject.
203. We are all members of the Family of Man and when the bell tolls, we should all take no-
rice, of course, but there must be some outside limit to the government's power to attribute one per-
son's acts or status to his or her relatives.
204. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (impropriety
of a provision of the Food Stamp Act which excluded from participation any household containing an
individual unrelated to any other member of the household); Tyson v. New York City Housing
Authority, 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (impropriety of city housing agency's evicting resi-
dents because of the criminal behavior of their adult children); Marotti v. White, 342 F. Supp. 823
(D. Conn. 1972) (impropriety of state welfare regulation applying a more restrictive standard to
persons living with relatives than to other persons); A. ScssoRR, FmnAi, REsPoNsmiLrrY iN a MoDEaN
AmnsicAN FAmsy (196i); Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, i Fmmn
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or to develop at length the prediction that the Code will not forever remain
a walled enclave, immune to the winds of change.
V. CONCLUSION
During a 1963 discussion at the Brookings Institution of a forthcoming
book on federal taxation of the family, a participant commented: "I don't
think that 27 economists should have been assembled to address themselves
to problems which are really partly anthropological, partly sociological,
partly anything except what we have competence in." 0' In point of fact,
some of the "27 economists" at the Brookings convocation were lawyers,
but their expertise in matters anthropological and sociological was prob-
ably not enhanced by either their legal training or their innocence of eco-
nomics. No doubt a squad of anthropologists and sociologists could have
added some insights to the melange of views expressed at the meeting, but
definitive answers to the issues under discussion could not have come from
any corner of the behavioral sciences.
If my extended essay has a unifying theme, it is that theoreticians, what-
ever their backgrounds, cannot "solve" the problem of taxing family in-
come. They can identify the issues that must be resolved, point out conflicts
among the objectives to be served, propose alternative approaches, and pre-
dict the outcome of picking one route rather than another. Having per-
formed these functions, the expert must give way to the citizen, whose
judgments in the end can rest on nothing more precise or permanent than
collective social preferences. Once the citizenry casts the die, however, the
expert is entitled to offer a postscript, namely, that the chosen solution will
itself turn out, sooner or later, to be a problem.
Santayana once credited an unnamed "accomplished mathematician"
with the observation that "all problems are divided into two classes, sol-
uble questions, which are trivial, and important questions, which are in-
soluble."" '° To mathematicians and philosophers, searching for great truths
sub specie aeternitatis, the questions canvassed in my Essay no doubt seem
trivial. But a close reading of the epigram reveals that it leaves open the
possibility that some trivial questions are insoluble. In this respect, if in no
other, the taxation of family income resembles the weighty aesthetic prob-
lems that reminded Santayana of the soluble-insoluble dichotomy.
L.Q., Dec. 2967, at 55; Sigworth, The Legal Status of Antinepotism Regulations, 58 BULL. Am. Ass'N
U. PROF MSSos 31 (1972).
2o5. H. GnoVmS, supra note 3, at 93 n.i. See also note 146 supra. For a less diffident view of
the scope of economics, see note 158 supra.
2o6. Santayana, What Is Aesthetics?, in i SELE=raD CarricA. WarrNos OF GEoRGE SANTAYNA
245 (N. Henfrey ed. x968).
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